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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION, JAPAN’S NORMALIZATION
AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
by
Zenel Garcia
Florida International University 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Thomas Breslin, Major Professor
China’s military modernization has allowed it to take a more assertive position on
the territorial disputes it currently has with Japan and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The
South China Sea (SCS) dispute is a clear example. Meanwhile, Japan is normalizing its
military status to play a more proactive security role in the region. Japan’s normalization
process has been greatly influenced by China’s growing military capabilities as it fears
that China could pose a threat to its sea lanes of communications. Although Japan does
not have territorial claims in the SCS, it regards the SCS as a strategically vital area. It is
this particular concern that has brought Japan into the current territorial disputes in the
SCS. This thesis analyzes how Japan has tried to forge partnerships with Southeast Asian
countries in the form of foreign aid and the provision of military equipment and training
that can potentially offset China’s assertiveness.
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i. Introduction:
Background
East and Southeast Asia are projected to be the most economically dynamic
regions in the world for the coming years. With an average GDP growth of 7.1% in 2013,
the area is expected to “contribute 40% of global growth and one-third of global trade
this year; higher than any other region in the world.”1 However, despite its economic
vitality, East and Southeast Asia continue to be plagued by ongoing territorial disputes
among a number of states. These disputes do not appear to be headed towards peaceful
resolution and could potentially derail the economic aspirations of many countries in the
region as well as abroad. The most critical of the ongoing rows in East and Southeast
Asia is the South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes. This is the result of a number of
factors: particularly the SCS’s global position as maritime superhighway, its significant
energy deposits, and its abundant marine resources. The territorial disputes have the
potential to disrupt global trade and potentially destabilize the region.
Maritime Superhighway
Stretching from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Luzon Straits in the
northeast, the SCS serves as one of the main arteries for global shipping. Over “50% of
the world’s merchant fleet tonnage crosses through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok
Straits, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea.”2 The tanker traffic that
passes through the Malacca Straits “is more than three times greater than the Suez Canal
1

“East Asia Pacific Economic Update, October 2013 – Rebuilding Policy Buffers and Reinvigorating
Growth,” The World Bank, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eap/publication/east-asiapacific-economic-update-october-2013 (Accessed November 15, 2013)
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Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Pg. 65

1

traffic, and well over five times more than the traffic of the Panama Canal.”3 The Energy
Information Administration (EIA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Energy,
estimated that by the end of 2011 oil trade passing through the Malacca Straits was
greater than 15 million barrels per day (BPD), amounting to one-third of all seaborne oil
and second only to the Strait of Hormuz (See Map 1).4 The EIA also reported that “about
6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of liquefied natural gas, or more than half of global LNG trade,
passed through the South China Sea in 2011. Half of this amount continued on to Japan,
with the rest of it going to South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other regional countries (See
Map 2).”5 Lastly, significant quantities of coal from Australia and Indonesia, which are
the world’s two largest coal exporters, are transported through the SCS to markets around
the world, particularly China and Japan.6
The sea lanes of communications (SLOC) of most countries in the region traverse
through the SCS, making it a lifeline to the economic security of these countries. As a
result, the potential for conflict over territorial disputes in the SCS is of vital importance
for countries which rely heavily on energy imports and whose economies are primarily
driven by exports of manufactured goods. This is particularly the case with Japan which
relies on its SCS SLOC for 80% of its oil supply and 70% of its exports. Therefore, “any

3

Khemakorn, Pakjuta, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region,”
United Nations – The Nippon Foundation, 2006, Pg. 14,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khem
akorn_0607_thailand.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013)

4

“The South China Sea is an Important World Energy Trade Route,”
Energy Information Administration, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10671 (Accessed December 20, 2013)

5

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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disruption of the maritime traffic due to frictions between claimant states or undue
control by a single dominant power would have a catastrophic impact on Japan. For this
reason, the SCS is seen as a “national security concern” by diplomatic authorities.”7

Map 1. SCS daily oil trade flows in 2011.
Source EIA: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs

7

Pajon, Celine, “Japan and the South China Sea: Forging Strategic Partnerships in a Divided Region,”
Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Center for Asian Studies, 2013, Pg. 7,
http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7555 (Accessed September 20, 2013)
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Map 2. SCS daily LNG trade flows in 2011.
Source EIA: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs

Energy Deposits
The second factor that makes the SCS increasingly important is its estimated
energy deposits. The robust economic growth in the region is expected to increase the
demand for fossil fuels. The EIA projects that Asian countries outside of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) will have a 2.6% annual increase in
demand for liquid fuels. This will result in an increased share of global consumption from
20% in 2008 to 30% by 2035.8 Non-OECD Asian countries’ natural gas consumption is
also expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.9%; increasing their share of global
8

“South China Sea,” Energy Information Administration, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs (Accessed December 20, 2013)

4

consumption from 10% in 2008 to 19% by 2035. The “EIA expects China to account for
43 percent of that growth.”9 “With Southeast Asian domestic oil production projected to
remain flat or decline as consumption rises, the region's countries will look to new
sources of energy to meet domestic demand.” 10 As a result, these countries are
increasingly looking to the SCS as a potential source of energy to meet national demands
in order to continue promoting economic growth. This has created an imperative for
securing parts of the SCS as a way to acquire new sources of fossil fuel. However, the
territorial disputes in the region have hindered efforts to conduct proper exploration of
energy resources in the area.
There are a number of conflicting claims regarding the oil and natural gas
deposits in the SCS. The Chinese have been the most enthusiastic in their estimates.
“Zhang Dawei, an official at China’s Ministry of Land Resources, has optimistically
claimed that the South China Sea might hold 23-40 billion tons of oil reserves.”11 That
figure is larger than China's current onshore resources. The Chinese have also estimated
that the area may contain more than 2,000 tcf of natural gas reserves.12 A different study
conducted by the state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC)
estimates that the SCS holds around 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 tcf of natural gas.
However, no independent studies have been able to confirm any of the optimistic

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.
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Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Pg. 77
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estimates provided by Chinese agencies or corporations.13 A 1995 study conducted by
Russia’s Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries concluded that deposits
were closer to 6 billion barrels of oil in the Spratly Islands, of which 70% would be
natural gas.14
Two American agencies have also conducted surveys of the area, providing yet
another set of conflicting figures. The EIA estimates that the oil and natural gas reserves
in the SCS are 11 billion barrels and 190 tcf respectively. The report indicates that these
figures represent proven and probable reserves and are much closer to the high-end
estimate.15 In the next survey:
“The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) analyzed the potential for undiscovered
conventional oil and gas fields within several geologic provinces of Southeast Asia in
2010 as part of its World Petroleum Resources Assessment Project. The study included a
significant area of the South China Sea, which the USGS estimates may contain
anywhere between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic
feet of gas in as-yet undiscovered resources (not including the Gulf of Thailand and other
areas adjacent to the South China Sea). These additional resources are not considered
commercial reserves at this time because it is unclear how economically feasible it would
be to extract them.”16

Despite the conflicting claims, however, the fact is that the SCS does possess valuable
energy resources which are desperately needed in the region in order to promote
continued economic growth. Chinese media in particular have referred to the area as the
“Second Persian Gulf.”17

13

“South China Sea,” Energy Information Administration, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs (Accessed December 20, 2013)
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Banlaoi, Rommel C., Philippines-China Security Relations: Current Issues and Emerging Concerns
(Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), Pg. 25
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“South China Sea,” Energy Information Administration, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs (Accessed December 20, 2013)
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Marine Resources
The third major factor that makes the SCS important is its abundant marine
resources. This is underscored by the fact that by 1995 the SCS contributed to 12% of the
total marine global production as well as 54% of marine culture production.18 The fishing
industry is one of the most important sectors to the economy and livelihood of the many
states in the SCS region. During the 3-year span of 2000-2003 the per capita consumption
of fish in the region was 26.1kg a year. Compared to the world average of 16.3kg a year,
it is clear that the states in the SCS area rely heavily on fish and other marine foods for
nutrition and protein.19 As a matter of fact “fish protein is more than 22 percent of the
average Asian diet, significantly higher than the global average of 16 percent.”20 The
fishing industry is a multi-billion dollar a year business that is a major provider of
employment and income for millions of people in the region.
“In 1994, the estimated numbers of full and part-time fishers engaged in marine and
inland fisheries were 8.7 million and 1.7 million, respectively. According to FAO's
findings, around 85% of the world's fishers are concentrated in Asia, particularly in the
SCS region, compared to 77% in 1970. China has the largest number of fishers followed
by Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. In total, at least 31 million people are

(Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), Pg. 25
18

Gomez, Edgardo D., “Is the Degradation of Resources in the South China Sea Reversible?:
Approaches to Sustainable Management,” International Symposium of Protection and
Management of the Coastal Marine Ecosystem, 2000, Pg. 219,
http://www.emecs.or.jp/2000thai-sympo/pdf/re-gomes.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2013)

19

Khemakorn, Pakjuta, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region,”
United Nations – The Nippon Foundation, 2006, Pg. 29,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khem
akorn_0607_thailand.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013)

20

Cronin, Patrick M., China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implication for the United States,”
Center for a New American Security, 2012,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Testimony%20Cronin%20012612_1
.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2013)

7

engaged in the fisheries sector (including aquaculture) and related industries in the
region.”21

The biodiversity of the SCS makes it a prime location for marine resource
extraction. “According to a Chinese study, species abundance in the SCS region includes:
1,027 fish, 91 shrimp and 73 cephalopod species in the Northern continental shelf;
approximately 205 fish and 96 shrimp species in the continental slope, and more than 520
fish species around the islands and reefs of the Southern waters.”22 However, intense
overfishing and pollution are causing concerns over the long-term productivity of the
area.23 This appears to be a particular concern in the coastal areas of the SCS states, and
as a result, most have ventured beyond their territorial waters and deeper into the
contested areas of the SCS. Consequently, fishing has become a politically sensitive issue
for the disputing countries. Numerous encounters have resulted in the apprehension of
fishing crews. Many have been fined, harassed, and even killed.24
The South China Sea Disputes
As previously stated, the vital resources and strategic location of the SCS make
the ongoing territorial disputes the most important security problem in the East and
Southeast Asia region. It is a dispute that can destabilize the economies of the states in
the SCS area and can threaten the interests of regional and global powers like Japan, and
21

Khemakorn, Pakjuta, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region,”
United Nations – The Nippon Foundation, 2006, Pg. 29,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khem
akorn_0607_thailand.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013)

22

Ibid. Pg. 18-19

23

Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Pg. 77

24

Storey, Ian, “The South China Sea Dispute (Part 1): Negative Trends Continue in 2013,”
The Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13:12 (2013), Pg. 3-6,
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_06_09.pdf (Accessed, December 5, 2013)

8

the United States. While these states do not have direct territorial claims on the SCS, they
depend on the freedom of navigation in the area in order to conduct trade, research, and
surveillance operations. In essence, these states have a vested interest in keeping their
SLOC in the SCS open. Armed conflict among the disputing parties could potentially
threaten this national interest. These powers are also concerned that sole Chinese control
of all SCS features could mean a disruption of their SLOC.
The parties to the current disputes include: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines,
Malaysia and Brunei. All of them are signatories to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The current statuses of the claims are as follows:




“A dispute over the Paracel Islands in the SCS, which are claimed by China and
Vietnam, and occupied by China;
A dispute over the Spratly Islands in the SCS, which are claimed entirely by
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Brunei, and which are occupied in part by all these countries except Brunei; and
A dispute over Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, which is claimed by China,
Taiwan, and the Philippines.”25 (See Maps 3&4)
For the purposes of the present paper the only claims which will be evaluated are

those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Philippines, and Vietnam. The reason
for narrowing the list of claimants is a result of their relevance to the overall research
topic which will be discussed below. In the Spratly archipelago China occupies 7 features,
Vietnam 21, and the Philippines 9.26 There is a 10th Philippine area that appears to be
absent from most available listings of SCS features currently under control by a
sovereign state. This feature is internationally known as the Second Thomas Shoal, a
25

O’Rourke, Ronald, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 2013, Pg. 1,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf (Accessed September 12, 2013)

26

Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “The South China Sea Disputes: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions,”
The Jamestown Foundation, 2009, Pg. 10

9

small shoal in which the Philippines maintains a minor force composed of 10 marines.
They are housed in a World War II-era landing transport ship which was intentionally run
aground in 1999 in order to establish a permanent presence in the area.27

27

Bonnie Glaser and Alison Szalwinski, “Second Thomas Shoal Likely the Next Flashpoint in South China
Sea,” The Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13:13 (2013), Pg. 5-6,
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_06_21.pdf (Accessed December 5, 2013)

10

Map 3. SCS maritime claims.
Source EIA: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs

11

Map 4: Spratly Island claims & occupations. Source The NYT and the State Department:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/31/world/asia/Territorial-Claims-in-South-ChinaSea.html?_r=3&

China
Chinese claims on the SCS are largely based on historical and archeological
grounds. They cite the numerous expeditions sent to the area during the Han Dynasty in
110 CE and by the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century.28 Furthermore, historical references,
maps, and artifacts have been used to supplement their territorial claims.29 After World
War II (WWII) ended, Japan, which had been occupying many of the features in the
Paracel and Spratly Islands for many years, withdrew its forces and abandoned all claims

28

Burgess, J. Peter, “The Politics of the South China Sea: Territoriality and International Law,”
Security Dialogue 34:1 (2003), Pg. 8,
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Burgess,%20Politics%20of%20the%20South%20Chi
na%20Sea-Territoriality%20and%20.pdf (Accessed December 5, 2013)

29

Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Pg. 67

12

in the region. This paved the way for the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-Shek to
define Chinese traditional claims in the area by drawing up the now-famous nine-dash
map. The U-shaped line map was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after
their victory over the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-Shek. Although the original map
consisted of 11 dashes, Premier Zhou Enlai approved the removal of two of the lines
around the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953. Subsequent maps published by the PRC have shown
9 rather than 11 lines.30 The San Francisco Treaty of 1951 finalized the terms of Japanese
surrender and as a response the CCP formalized its claims in the SCS by referring to the
Nationalist map (See Map 5).31
This map represents the most expansive claim among the parties to the disputes
because of the fact that the U-shaped line that it forms covers roughly 80% of the total
area of the SCS. 32 The area far exceeds what is claimable as territorial waters under
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is a problem exacerbated by the
fact that the claimed area includes waters that lie well within the claimable Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.33 For its part
China has been ambiguous over what the nine-dash line in the map actually represents. It
is unclear whether the Chinese are claiming sovereignty over the entire sea and seabed in
30

Li Jinming and Li Dexia, “The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note,”
Ocean Development & International Law 34 (2003), Pg. 290,
http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Li%20and%20LiThe%20Dotted%20Line%20on%20the%20Map.pdf (Accessed September 11, 2013)

31

Emmers, Ralf, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Pg. 67

32

O’Rourke, Ronald, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 2013, Pg. 9,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf (Accessed September 12, 2013)

33

Ibid. Pg. 11
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the enclosed area, or if it is making more limited claims, such as sovereignty over the
land features or to historical fishing and navigational rights.34
Despite some ambiguity over the exact claims being made by the Chinese
government with the nine-dash line, it does appear that at minimum China is claiming
sovereignty over the island groups within the area enclosed by U-shaped line on the map.
The island groups claimed are the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), the Paracel Islands (Xisha),
Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha).35 China’s 1992 Law on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone placed these island groups under the
administration of Hainan Island Province.36 This claim was further reinforced in 2009
when China submitted the nine-dash map to the United Nations with an accompanying
statement that read:
“China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the
adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as
well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map [of the nine-dash line]). The
above position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by
the international community.”37

34

Ben Dolven and others, eds., “Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, 2013, Pg. 8, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42930.pdf
(Accessed September 12, 2013)

35

Dutton, Peter, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives, China and the South China Sea,”
Naval War College Review 2011, Pg. 45

36

Khemakorn, Pakjuta, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region,”
United Nations – The Nippon Foundation, 2006, Pg. 24,
http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khem
akorn_0607_thailand.pdf (Accessed November 12, 2013)

37

O’Rourke, Ronald, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China:
Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 2013, Pg. 12,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf (Accessed September 12, 2013)
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The Chinese statement was made in response to a joint submission made by
Malaysia and Vietnam regarding their territorial claims to the United Nations.38 By June
2012 the Chinese government had announced that it would be upgrading the
administrative level of Sansha city, a city that is located on an island in the Paracel Island
group. The following month the PRC stated that a military garrison would be set up on
the island. Sansha city is used to administer the disputed areas in the SCS.39
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The Philippines
The Republic of the Philippines’ claims in the SCS are also based on historical
justifications as well as the principle of terra nullius, which essentially means that the
islands were not occupied or under the sovereign authority of any other state. The
Philippines began laying claims in the SCS as early as 1947. At the time the Spratly
Islands were referred as the “New Southern Islands” by the Philippine government. The
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary at the time, Carlos P. Garcia, requested the Allied
Forces to place the islands under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, citing security
reasons.40 In the same year a Filipino businessman and lawyer by the name of Tomas
Cloma established settlements in the Spratlys and declared them a protectorate. He
named the group of islands he identified or settled as the “Kalaya’an” or
“Freedomland.”41
By 1974 Cloma deeded the Kalaya’an group to the Philippine government and in
both 1971 and 1978 the Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared the Kalaya’an
Island Group (KIG) to be formally part of the Philippines.42 The 1978 declaration was
made official through Presidential Decree No. 1596 in which the KIG are identified as a
municipality of Palawan.43 Since 1968 the Philippines has had a military presence in the
KIG group and effectively controls and administers at least 8 of its features. The KIG
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also hosts residents who participate in local elections, a fact that allows the Philippine
government to demonstrate sovereignty in the area.44 It is the exploration and “discovery”
of the KIG group by Tomas Cloma that serves as one of the historical bases of the
Philippine claim.
The second historical bases for the Philippine claim comes from previous treaties
it had signed with other parties in order to demarcate maritime boundaries. “The
Philippines continues to claim that all of the waters between its baselines and the lines
defined by a series of

treaties dating from 1898, 1900, and 1930, the so-called

“Philippines Treaty Limits” or “Philippines Box,” constitute its territorial waters.” 45
These claims essentially extend the Philippines’ territorial sea from the 12 nautical miles
allowed by the UNCLOS to 285 nautical miles. Although the disparity between the
customary law of the UNCLOS and these treaties is clear, the Philippines has had
difficulties abandoning the Treaty Limits claim as a result of domestic pressures as well
as constitutional constraints.46
The Philippine justification for its terra nullius claim is centered on the Japanese
withdrawal from the area after its defeat in WWII. Because Japan did not cede the islands
to any other nation in the San Francisco Treaty, the islands were given the status of
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“trusts.” This essentially nullified any previous ownership of the islands. As a result, the
Philippine government felt that its occupation of the islands was justified.47
In recent years the Philippine government has attempted to bring its SCS claims
more in line with the UNCLOS because of the fact that its Treaty Limits claim was
undermining its position as a claimant.48 In 2009 the Philippine Congress ratified the
Archipelagic Baselines Act. In accordance with UNCLOS provisions the Philippine
claimed 12 nautical miles of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of EEZ from straight
from territorial baselines. The Kalaya’an box that previously used to encapsulate the 53
features that it claimed has been done away with, although the Philippine continues to lay
claim to those features under the “Regime of Islands” clause in the UNCLOS. At present
only a small section of its southern boundary with Malaysia continues to be determined
by the Treaty of Paris which is one of the treaties that make up the old Treaty Limits.49
Vietnam
Like the other claimants, Vietnam bases some of its claims on historical usage.
Court records from the reign of King Le Thanh Tong (1460-1497) indicate that Vietnam
claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. This historical claim is reinforced by
Vietnamese maps dated to the 17th century that incorporated the Spratlys into Vietnam.50
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Like China, Vietnam has also presented archeological evidence to bolster its claims to the
Spratly and Paracel Islands.51 In addition to historical usage and archeological evidence,
the Vietnamese government proclaims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Island
groups based on French colonial claims. When Vietnam became a protectorate of France
in 1884 in the aftermath of the Sino-French War, France declared sovereignty over the
entirety of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, an act which continues to be used to
justify Vietnamese claims to this day.52
Like the Philippines, Vietnam has made some of its claims on the concept of
terra/res nullius. The Vietnamese claim that before the French formally occupied some
of the features in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in 1933, the islands were
essentially unclaimed and therefore a “no man’s land.”53 As a result, Vietnam took over
the sovereignty of the islands after Vietnam became independent. Since 1973 the
Vietnamese have controlled up to 22 features in the Spratly Island group alone, making
them the most significant holder of territory among the claimants.54 Although Vietnam
also claims sovereignty over the Paracels, the PRC effectively evicted the Vietnamese
from the archipelago in 1974 after an intense naval battle.55 Fortunes for the Vietnamese
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have fared much better in the Spratly archipelago. After establishing a significant
foothold there in the 70s, in 2007 the Vietnamese government held local elections in the
area in order for the inhabitants to select a representative to the National Assembly.56 The
Spratlys, known as Hoang Sa in Vietnam, are currently administered as a district of the
Khahn Hoa province.57
The division of Vietnam from the 1950s to the 1970s led to some confusion in
regards to the claims being made in the SCS. North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong
stated that his government recognized the PRC claims in both the Paracel and Spratly
Islands. In contrast, the South Vietnamese government located in Saigon held on to its
claims on both groups.58 In fact it was the Saigon government that had been occupying
the Paracels when the PRC dislodged its forces from the archipelago. The North did not
acknowledge the casualties suffered by the South during this clash and instead supported
its communist ally in the claims.59 However, when South and North Vietnam reunited in
1975, Vietnam reasserted its claims to both island groups that the South had previously
contested.60
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In recent years, much in the same way as the Philippines, Vietnam has attempted
to clarify its claims in the SCS in order to bring them into proper standing with the
UNCLOS. In 2003 Vietnam signed a treaty with Indonesia that delimited the continental
shelf and the EEZ boundaries between the two countries. That was followed by an
agreement with China in 2004 that delimited the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of
Tonkin.61 Then in 2009 Vietnam and Malaysia made a join submission to the United
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The submission
dealt with claims beyond the 200 nautical mile EEZ. Lastly in 2012, Vietnam ratified a
legislation called the Law of the Sea in which it claimed a 200 nautical mile EEZ and a
350 nautical mile continental shelf from its baselines. 62 While there remain some
discrepancies regarding certain portions of Vietnam’s claims that do not fall in
accordance with this new law, it is clear that it has made some efforts to bring its claims
up to UNCLOS standards much the same manner as the Philippine has done.
A Code of Conduct
After a decade of heightened tensions in the SCS leading to perceptions of a
“China threat” among South East Asian countries, Beijing agreed to discuss a Code of
Conduct (CoC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These
discussions led to the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) in 2002. This became a key
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component of China’s “charm offensive” in the region.63 The DoC outlines principles for
avoiding conflicts in the SCS. It stated that:
“The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by
peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea.”64

Although the DoC called for the peaceful resolution of the disputes, it was non-binding,
and therefore could not enforce any of its principles. The DoC was successful in easing
tensions in the region for a number of years; however, by 2007 China had reverted to its
assertive posture in the SCS. 65 The return to heated rhetoric and clashes among the
disputing parties has essentially stalled negotiations for a formal CoC in the SCS.
ii. The Research:
Background
This research will address questions concerning the relationships between the
PRC, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan. Although Japan is not a claimant to any of the
SCS features, it has been enhancing its economic and political presence in the area
because of the fact that the SCS is the main artery of its SLOC. Since Japan also has an
ongoing dispute with the PRC in the East China Sea (ECS) over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, Tokyo is concerned that Beijing’s attempt to change the status quo in the SCS
could be a precursor to an escalation in the ECS.

As a matter of fact, Japan has
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considered the disputes in the SCS and ECS as interrelated since 1992 when China
passed its “Law on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas,” in which it claimed
sovereignty over the Spratly and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.66
China’s emergence as a more powerful and assertive actor has been one of the key
factors in the rising tensions in the SCS and ECS. Its growing military capabilities have
been instrumental in allowing it to undertake a more active and assertive role in its
maritime periphery, something which has concerned nearly all of the countries in the
region.67 As a reaction to China’s growing assertiveness many of the countries in the area
have undertaken military modernization programs of their own in order to provide a
minimum credible defense along their coasts and their contested territories with China,
resulting in what may be perceived as an arms race. This perception is reinforced by the
fact that by 2010 defense spending among Southeast Asian countries was 60% higher
than it was in 2001.68
Additionally, Southeast Asian countries have been pursuing a number of
measures in order to protect themselves and their claims from further Chinese
encroachment. The most immediate measure has been to socialize China within
multilateral organizations, particularly ASEAN. The reasoning for this has been to find
strength in numbers since four out of the ten ASEAN members have disputes in the SCS
66
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with China.69 The second measure has been to pursue a strategy of hedging by inviting
global and regional powers to play a larger role in the security of the region. 70
Increasingly these countries have turned to Japan, an American ally, as another potential
hedge vis-à-vis China. For its part Japan “is willing to play a role in the “great game” of
influence currently underway in Southeast Asia, in which Tokyo is soft-balancing China and is
supporting a more sustainable US military presence.”71
Thesis Questions

Having provided the background information to the current territorial disputes in
the SCS and the rationale for its significance, we turn to the research questions that will
inform the remainder of the paper. The present study will attempt to answer the following
questions:
1. How does China’s Military Modernization affect Japanese Normalization?
2. How does China’s Military Modernization affect the SCS disputes?
3. How does Japan’s Normalization affect the SCS disputes?
Hypotheses
1. China’s military capabilities have significantly increased in recent decades as a
result of its modernization programs. Increased military capabilities have enabled it to
become more assertive in its territorial disputes with other countries in the region. Few
other countries in the area have been more concerned about these developments than
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Japan. Japan finds China’s lack of military transparency and intensification of maritime
activities as a serious security concern.72 Therefore, while Japan’s normalization process
predates Chinese military advancements, it has served as a stimulus to hasten reforms.
Anxiety over the Chinese military developments in the SCS prompted the Japanese to
devote a section of their defense white paper to the area in 2012, citing growing concerns
over the freedom of navigation in the region.73
2. After a period of relative cooperation in the early years of the 2000s, China
resumed its hardline stance in the SCS.74 There have been a number of clashes in the SCS
in recent years that has resulted in the intensification of the disputes.75 This has led to the
increase of the military budgets for most countries in the region over the past decade as
they seek to bolster their defensive capabilities. Although the littoral countries in the SCS
are aware that China’s military capabilities far exceed their own, they are determined to
maintain at least a minimum credible defense capability. Japan appears to be willing to
provide some assistance in this regard, particularly in the provision of coast guard vessels
and training.76
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3. While Japan has been a significant investor in Southeast Asia, its political
weight has been relatively negligible for many decades. This was a result of the fact that
many of the countries in Southeast Asia endured brutal occupations by Japanese Imperial
forces during WWII which nurtured strong distrust among the locals towards Japan.77
However, decades of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and investment from
Japan to these countries have done much to normalize relations and create a more
positive view among ASEAN members towards Japan.78 Japan’s normalization process,
which begun in the early 1990s, has brought a new period of political and military
engagement in the region. This engagement has predominantly taken the form of peacebuilding activities under the umbrella of the United Nations. The Japanese Self-Defense
Forces (JSDF) have participated in U.N. missions to Cambodia in 1992 and Timor-Leste
in 2002.79 In recent years Tokyo has also been actively engaged in providing securityoriented development assistance for Southeast Asian states in order to support maritime
capacity-building. 80 This indicates that a normalizing Japan wishes to play a more
proactive political and security role in the region; something which it was unable or
unwilling to do in decades past.
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Methodology, Theoretical Framework, and Structure
Methods
The methodology that will be employed for the present study will include a
theoretical framework grounded in international relations theory, a historical analysis,
and case studies. The theory will aid in framing the dynamics of the disputes as well as
provide the groundwork for predicting possible outcomes of the disputes. The historical
analyses will provide background information concerning the developments of the
territorial disputes in recent years among China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. A
historical overview of Sino-Japanese security relations will also be provided. Finally, the
case studies will be centered on the Philippines and Vietnam and will highlight Japan’s
increasing interest in establishing security cooperation agreements with each of these
countries in order to secure its sea lanes of communications.
Different categories of sources will be used. In the historical analysis, books and
journal articles in the historical and security fields will be the main sources of
information. For China’s military modernization, books and journal articles in the field of
strategic and foreign policy will be used. The section on the normalization of Japan will
rely on journal articles in the field of international relations and law in order to
conceptualize the constitutional limitations under which Japan currently operates.
Primary sources and periodicals will help illustrate the securitization of China in Japanese
discourse, and how that continues to drive the Japanese normalization process. The
primary sources will come from transcripts of different speeches given by Japanese
officials, particularly Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers. These
sources along with a number of periodicals will also be used in the case studies due to the
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lack of academic sources pertaining to Japan’s security cooperation agreements with
Southeast Asian countries.
Theoretical Framework
The present study will rely on the application of Barry Buzan’s and Ole Waever’s
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to provide a theoretical framework. RSCT
facilitates the understanding of the complex relationships that underpin the countries that
will be studied in this research paper. The regional level of analysis provided by the
RSCT allows for a clearer understanding of the security dynamics in the region, which
can ultimately assist in predicting the outcomes of the numerous disputes that plague the
area. An RSC is defined as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization,
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be
reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”81 RSCs are also characterized
by “durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of subglobal, geographically
coherent patterns of security interdependence. The particular character of local RSC will
often be affected by historical factors such as long-standing enmities.”82 RSCT contends
that geographical proximity intensifies security interaction. Therefore, security
interaction between neighbors is stronger than with states in different areas.83
Buzan and Waever put forth the idea that Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia
began to merge as a single RSC in the 1990s. They identify two factors that facilitated
this phenomenon: the end of the cold war and economic integration. The vacuum left by
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the withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Southeast Asia, and in some respects,
Northeast Asia, allowed China to increase its influence and power. Long-standing
military links between China and some Southeast Asian countries became strengthened
as a result. The second factor came from Japanese investments in Southeast Asia which
created economic interdependence in the region, interdependence that increasingly
became linked to regional security and stability. Consequently, the two separate regions
became a single East Asian Supercomplex (EAS).84
Because the EAS is significantly influenced not only by the security relations
among the smaller states, but also by the two main regional powers, this paper will assess
the security relations between China and Japan. Studying the security dynamic between
the two powers will allow for better contextualization of the ongoing disputes and the
possible ways in which they may be resolved. Since amity and enmity are important
factors in the RSCT, it will be important to understand the history or relations between
the two powers as well as the securitization or desecuritization language that is aimed at
one another.
Structure and Organization
The research section of the thesis will be broken down into a number of chapters
and subsections. The first chapter will cover Sino-Japanese relations in order to provide
some historical background and examine the perceptions they have towards each other.
The second chapter will focus on China’s military modernization programs as well as its
military doctrines and policies towards the SCS. The third chapter will address the
Japanese normalization process and how Japan’s evolving security needs have promoted
84
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an active SCS policy to balance Chinese power. The fourth and fifth chapter will be
composed of case studies involving two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and
Vietnam respectively. These two have been chosen due to the fact that these two
countries have been the most active in disputing their claims against China which has
resulted in more clashes with the PRC. These are also two of the three Southeast Asian
countries which Japan has identified as “key partners for active Japanese security
reengagement in Southeast Asia.” 85 The final chapter will be the conclusion where
potential outcomes to the disputes will be addressed and discussed.
Chapter I: Sino-Japanese Security Relations
Historical Legacy
China and Japan share a long and distinct history. The proximity between the two
countries enabled contact between the two cultures since the first century in the Common
Era. Exchanges between China and Japan flourished over the centuries which enabled
China to influence much of Japanese development in the form of writing, philosophical
traditions, religion and culture. However, the roles of teacher and student were reversed
in the 19th century as Japan modernized and China fell into a semi-colonial status under
foreign powers. Japan’s defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1885 was
devastating for China which had to pay huge indemnities and cede territories to its former
pupil. Full-scale invasion of the Chinese mainland in the 1930s by the Japanese has left a
legacy of bitterness which continues to affect their relations in the 21st century.86
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The legacy of the atrocities committed by Japan in China during the 1930s until
the end of WWII in 1945 remains a point of contention between the two countries. For its
part, the CCP leadership believes that Japan has not adequately apologized for the crimes
committed during its invasion of China. The Japanese government’s failure to pass any
kind of resolution admitting to the atrocities committed by its own troops has only
strengthened the Chinese belief that Japan has not repented for the actions taken by its
soldiers during that tumultuous period.87 Another detrimental issue related to this WWII
legacy is the fact that Japanese school textbooks habitually diminish the scope of
Japanese atrocities during WWII, particularly the crimes that were committed in China
during the Nanking rape and the experiments conducted by Unit 731.
This has been a politically charged issue between the two countries for decades
now.88 Repeated visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine which honors
all Japanese soldiers killed in war, including 14 Class-A war criminals from WWII, has
only played to Chinese sensitivities and has created further strains in bilateral ties. During
his tenure, CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin requested that Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
refrain from visits to the shrine, but Koizumi ignored the requests and continued to make
visits to the Yasukuni shrine throughout his tenure as PM, inciting anger from the
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Chinese side. 89 However, the most troubling point of contention between China and
Japan is the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The islands are currently
administered by Japan but are claimed by China. These briefly-mentioned historical
issues between the two countries have been repeatedly invoked in their political discourse,
and increasingly, their security agenda. Therefore, in order to understand Sino-Japanese
relations it is important to place them in proper historical context because this provides a
framework that allows us to understand their relationship.
Chinese Security Perceptions of Japan
Chinese security concerns regarding the Japanese have been primarily focused on
Taiwan. Many analysts agree that current PLA capabilities are aimed at deterring Taiwan
from achieving de jure independence and denying any outside intervention in a
Mainland-Taiwan conflict. Particular attention is placed on the United States and its main
ally in the region, Japan. The Chinese are wary of the U.S.-Japan alliance for a number of
reasons, but it is the Taiwan issue that is of highest concern. In 1997 the U.S. and Japan
revised the guidelines for their defense cooperation. This revision allowed for Japan to
assist the United States in conflicts outside of Japanese territories. 90 The Chinese
perceived this revision to be problematic for four reasons:
“First, in Japan-US-China triangular relations, Japan intends to sacrifice Chinese security
interests for Japan-US relations. The reason is that all military alliances must have an
imaginary enemy and it seems the Japan-US alliance is taking China as its imaginary
enemy. Second, the revised guidelines and related measures do not exclude Taiwan in
their scope. There is therefore a hidden danger of strategic conflicts between China and
the US-Japan alliance. Third, the revised guidelines are transforming the Japan-US
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military alliance into an Asian version of NATO. Although Japan’s roles will mainly be
to provide logistics and rear-area support, Japan is actually “sailing out in a borrowed
boat”. Therefore, Japan’s policies of “homeland defense” and “not to be a military power”
no longer exist. Finally, the revised guidelines and related measures have strengthened
91
domestic demands for revising Japan’s constitution.”

The fact that the revision does not exclude Taiwan in its scope has garnered
criticism from China because it creates the possibility that it may have to contend not
only with American but also Japanese involvement in a cross-strait conflict. Exacerbating
the issue was a 2005 joint statement made by the United States and Japan which indicated
that there should be a “peaceful resolution” to the Taiwan Strait issue. Considering that
Taiwan is a core national interest for the PRC, the Chinese responded by enacting the
Anti-Secession Law which legitimized non-peaceful means to prevent Taiwanese
independence. 92 This issue has been one of the main drivers for the PLA’s heavy
investment in missile technologies, in particular the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)
program in order to deter any involvement by U.S. and Japanese forces if such conflict
were to occur.
The fact that the Chinese perceive the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means of
containing Chinese military modernization has only been exacerbated by the joint
development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system between the two allies. The
program has solicited criticism from the Chinese side because it perceives that this
“missile shield” is aimed at China. Though the Japanese side agreed to the BMD
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programs on the grounds that it needed deterrence against a nuclear-armed North Korea,
the Chinese claim that current Japanese missile-interception capacity exceeds current
North Korean missile capabilities. Consequently, they believe that the Japanese have
“great-power” ambitions and that the true aim of the program is to reduce PLA missile
capabilities. Japan currently operates six Aegis-equipped destroyers, which are further
supported by over a dozen American Aegis destroyers deployed in the Pacific. The Aegis
system is a countermeasure platform capable of intercepting incoming missiles over a
vast area, which could theoretically negate any incoming missile threat. Chinese analysts
are quick to point out, that out of the six Aegis-equipped destroyers Japan currently
deploys, Japan only needs two in order to intercept incoming missiles from both China
and North Korea. Some go further, claiming that a single Aegis-equipped destroyer is
enough to provide full coverage over the Japanese archipelago.93
It is clear that China views Japan as a potential threat to its security and is very
suspicious of any steps taken by Japan to become a “normal” power. The PRC contends
that although Japan is supposedly “disarmed,” it maintains a large land force that
numbers 250,000, which is comparable to Britain, and has an annual defense budget of
over $50 billion; among the highest in the world.94 The Chinese perception of a Japanese
threat to its security has only strengthened their resolve to modernize their military as

93

Yoshibara, Toshi and Holmes, James R., Red Star Over The Pacific: China’s Rise and The Challenge to
U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), Pg. 112-113

94

Roy, Denny, “Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security Activity and SinoJapan Relations,” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003, Pg. 3,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/30172610?uid=3739256&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=
4&sid=21101516703917 (Accessed November 5, 2013)

35

quickly as possible in order to deter or balance any actions taken by the Japanese to fully
normalize itself as a military power.
Japanese Security Perceptions of China
China’s modernization program has been met by suspicion on many levels by the
Japanese. Tokyo is wary of Beijing’s defense expenditures which have seen double-digit
growth for over two decades now. China’s growth as an economic power and continual
progress in becoming a military power has taken place during a period in which Japan’s
own economy has stagnated; basically, a “modern Japan has never had to deal with a
strong China. World attention turned from the Japanese miracle to fascination with China
in a way that was psychologically jarring for Japan.”95 Subsequently, Japan has come to
perceive China as a security threat with the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) making a
public statement in 2004 alluding to the possibility of a future armed conflict with
China.96 Chinese incursions into the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands have only
increased the perception among Japanese officials that a modernized PLA has become
more assertive and is a potential threat.
These islands have been a source of contention between the two sides since the
United States handed administrative control of the islands to Japan in 1972. The PRC
claims that the islets belonged to the Taiwanese provincial jurisdiction which was ceded
to Japan by the ruling Qing Dynasty in the Treaty of Shimonoseki after China lost the
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First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. According to the Chinese the Diaoyu Islands, as they
are known in China, have been under Chinese control since the Ming Dynasty. Because
the Treaty of Shimonoseki was part of the “unequal treaties” that were rendered void at
the end of WWII, China believed that they should have been rightfully returned.
The Japanese claim to the islands, which are known as the Senkakus in Japan, is
made because Japan gained control of the Ryukyu island chain in 1879 and formally
annexed them in 1895. Since they claim that the Senkakus are formally part of the
Ryukyu island chain, they rightfully belong to Japan. The fact that the U.S. took no
position on the legal status of the islands when they handed administrative control to
Japan has created a problem for the Chinese. What further complicates this dispute is a
United Nations survey from 1968 which claimed that the sea surrounding the islands
contained vast oil and gas reserves. 97 Japan’s lack of energy resources and China’s
growing dependence on energy imports to fuel its economy have raised the stakes on the
sovereignty of the islands and the surrounding seas. Beyond the energy security
implications of the islands, this territorial dispute has been exacerbated time and time
over the years as Chinese vessels and aircraft have been found operating in the vicinity of
the islands. Sometimes these encroachments have been dangerous as the Japanese Coast
Guard (JCG) has had to interdict Chinese vessels. Encounters such as these can
potentially result in minor clashes or even an escalation of force.
The importance of submarine forces to China has added a new dimension to the
tension in the conflict between the two countries as there have been a number of Chinese
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research ships conducting surveys in the area which have the potential to map the ocean
floor. This becomes a critical security concern for Japan because of the fact that those
maps can be used by PLA submarines to conduct operations in the region. As a result, the
JCG has opted to deploy larger ships to the area in order to deter further Chinese
incursions. 98 As previously mentioned, increased PLA capabilities resulting from its
modernization programs have also raised concerns among Japanese officials who believe
that China poses a threat to Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC). Being a small
island country, Japan has little to no natural resources. It relies on energy imports for the
vast majority of its oil and gas consumption. The increased power-projection capabilities
of the PLA in both air and sea create anxieties in Japan because of the possibility of
Chinese interruption of the SLOC.99 Because of this, Taiwan has become an important
strategic asset regarding the security of the Japanese SLOC. According to Japanese
military analyst Shigeo Hiramatsu:
“Taiwan serves as a critical component of Japan’s sea-lane. If Taiwan were integrated
into China, the South China Sea would become China’s Sea, bringing the sea lane to the
Middle East and Southeast Asian countries under strong Chinese influence. China would
have more say over Japan’s Nansei Islands and the East China Sea. If the East China Sea
were brought under Chinese influence, the Yellow Sea would lose access to high seas and
become China’s inland sea, while the Korean Peninsula will fall under the Chinese sphere
of influence. Moreover, China will probably use Taiwan as a stepping-stone and make its
100
way into the Pacific….Taiwan is Japan’s ‘lifeline’”

This essentially means that the Japanese fear that growing PLA capabilities may
create a power imbalance across the straits which may result in strategic losses for Japan.
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China’s geographically dominant position in East Asia’s coastal periphery and its
growing military capabilities can eventually present a realistic threat to Japan’s shipping
lanes by restricting access to resources abroad. 101 The fact that the Japanese military
establishment sees Taiwan as a strategic asset to secure its SLOC lends credence to
Chinese fears of a possible Japanese intervention in a cross-straits conflict.
As a result of the numerous Chinese incursions into the Senkaku area and the
ongoing PLA modernization programs, the Japanese decided to formally terminate the
ODA program tailored for China in 2008.102 The ODA program for China began in 1979
shortly after the Sino-Japanese Rapprochement of 1972 in the wake of President Nixon’s
visit to China. This program consisted of low-interest loans as well as grants for China
which were aimed at developing infrastructure such as airports, seaports and roads which
directly benefited Japanese firms that were investing on the mainland. The origins of this
program began in 1972 when the Chinese and Japanese were normalizing their relations.
One of the pressing issues during the negotiations was the war reparations which
China felt Japan owed for the damage caused during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
However, from the Japanese perspective the Chinese had given up the rights to ask for
reparations in 1952 when the Nationalist government, which was the internationally
recognized government of China at the time, signed the Japan-Republic of China Treaty.
The fact that the Japanese delegation brought this treaty up angered Chairman Mao
Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. Nevertheless, because the Chinese felt that
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rapprochement with the United States and Japan was more important, they agreed to
waive the issue of reparations. Once Deng Xiaoping became the Chairman, he expressed
displeasure with the fact that China had waived the issue of reparations during
negotiations, but was not too vocal due to the fact that both Mao and Zhou still remained
important figures to the memory of the party. In 1978 Deng made a visit to Japan and
motioned that China would be open to low-interest loans from Japan to help in his
modernization initiatives. He was more explicit in a 1987 when he commented that Japan
had an obligation to help China in its development. He stated that Japan “has the biggest
debt to China. In 1972 China did not ask for reparations. Frankly speaking, we harbor
dissatisfaction over this point.”103 The Japanese agreed that assistance in the form of low
interest loans and grants would create good will between both sides and by the time the
program ended the Chinese had received billions in ODA.
Chapter II: China’s Military Modernization
Background
Since Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978,
China has undergone profound economic reforms. These economic reforms have proven
to be extremely successful as China’s economy has grown by more than 9% annually for
the better part of three decades.104 By 2010 China had surpassed Japan as the world’s
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second largest economy behind the United States.105 This economic growth has benefited
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which has used this new-found wealth to push for
comprehensive modernization programs across all of its service branches. Military
spending in China has grown by double digits annually since the early 1990s. The
Department of Defense (DOD) estimated that China’s defense budget for 2011 was $160
billion and will continue to rise for the foreseeable future.106 However, the current level
of defense spending has not always been the norm. During the initial phase of economic
reforms in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, China’s military ranked as the least
important among the proposed “four modernizations” (industry, agriculture, defense, and
science and technology) under the Deng Xiaoping regime.107 Much of the policies being
enacted during this time period were concentrated on economic growth and
modernization of the country’s industries. Nevertheless, while the economy remains the
main focus of Chinese policymaker’s agenda today, the military has begun to take a more
prominent role in the annual budget of the PRC.
Catalysts for Modernization
The increasingly prominent role of the military was the result of two key events
that occurred in the 1990s and served as the catalysts for PLA modernization. The first
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catalyst began with the Gulf War in 1991. The Chinese High Command was stunned by
the overwhelming force that the U.S. and its allies were able to bring to Saddam
Hussein’s military. The allies employed technologies that had not yet seen combat use
but the results were clear: absolute decimation of the Iraqi forces. The American forces
along with their Allies were able to penetrate Iraqi airspace with impunity by deploying
their sophisticated stealth fighters/bombers. Naval forces were able to launch cruise
missiles and other precision weaponry while remaining outside the range of the Iraqi
countermeasures. The use of electromagnetic warfare attacks and computer viruses to
infect enemy systems completely blinded Iraqi command and control networks rendering
them unable to coordinate defenses or counter Allied attacks. Equally impressive was the
use of global positioning systems (GPS) by the Allies to coordinate their movements
effectively and efficiently, something Iraqi forces were incapable of achieving. Chinese
generals were forced to admit that the PLA was ill-prepared to conduct war against any
modern military force.108 The leaders of the CCP acknowledged the need to properly
modernize the PLA so that it could operate effectively in the 21st century.
The second catalyst that fully cemented the modernization programs in the PRC
was the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1996. In March of that year the PLA’s Second Artillery
Corps (SAC), which is in charge of the strategic missiles in the military’s inventory,
began firing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) within miles of two vital Taiwanese
harbors, Keelung in the north and Kaohsiung in the south. The reason behind the
provocation was Taiwan’s first democratic elections. The PRC wanted to dissuade the

108

Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, Prospects
(Los Angeles: University of California Press 2004), Pg. 1-2

42

Taiwanese people from proceeding with the elections by undermining its government;
therefore, it resorted to intimidation conducting missile tests off the Taiwanese coast. The
United States responded by sending two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity. Once near
Taiwan, American forces began to conduct military exercises and monitoring operations
on the PLA in order to discourage further missile launches. This incident gave new
urgency to the modernization programs in the PLA because Chinese leaders now believed
that they would definitively have to contend with the United States if they chose to take
Taiwan by force. 109 These two instances served as the catalysts of the modernization
programs. It is at this point that the PLA decided to revise its operating doctrines and
strategies and began a comprehensive foreign weapon acquisition program as well as a
complete overhaul and modernization of its indigenous industrial military complex.
Military Doctrines
Among the first modernizing measures taken by the PLA was the overhaul of its
underlying doctrines and strategies. While it is difficult to ascertain completely accurate
pictures of the PLA’s strategies and doctrines, we have enough information from its
white papers to know the three publicly acknowledged doctrines. These are: “Active
Defense”, “Local War under Conditions of Informatization,” and “People’s War.” 110
These doctrines were formulated from the ground up or modified by PLA officers in
order to allow the military to operate using modern tactics and equipment. “Active
Defense” is a hotly debated concept. On the surface it is meant to be a purely defensive
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doctrine, essentially claiming that the Chinese would not be the first to initiate a conflict.
However, part of the doctrine also states that an enemy’s attack does not necessarily have
to be kinetic in order to warrant countermeasures. What this means is that the PRC can
perceive something as an attack even if it’s political or economic in nature. According to
the PLA publication: Science of Military Strategy, “Active Defense” entails the following:
“Strategically, we would fight only after the enemy has struck. But when foreign enemies
forced war on us, we should be able to deal out powerful counterattack and stop the
enemy’s offence in predetermined areas. After gradually depriving the enemy of his
strategic initiative, we would change strategic defensive to strategic offensive, so as to
111
utterly defeat the enemy’s invasion.”

While “Active Defense” provides the overarching doctrine for the military,
“Local War under Conditions of Informatization” provides the definite concept of how
the PLA will approach combat. The basic tenets of “Local War under Conditions of
Informatization” revolve around the perception that near-future wars will take place
primarily along China’s periphery. They will also be of short duration and limited in
scope, hence the “local” aspect of the doctrine. The Informatization part of the doctrine
invokes the fact that warfare in the 21st century, no matter the scope, will require
advanced technology to effectively win an engagement.
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The doctrine highly

emphasizes the asymmetrical nature of the balance of power between China and its
potential adversaries: Taiwan, U.S., and Japan. The PLA understands that its own
capabilities, while vastly improved over the past decades, still remain technologically
inferior compared to modern militaries.113 Keeping this in mind, the Chinese have sought
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to acquire technology and weapons that allow them to attack vital weaknesses in their
enemies’ military. One of the fundamental principles of this doctrine is “anti-access and
area denial” (A2/AD). This concept calls for particular weapons which allow China to
impede, restrict, or deter enemy movements in the area it wishes to exert control over;
this is particularly relevant in the case of Taiwan and trying to keep American and
Japanese forces from intervening should the PRC resort to using force to retake the island.
The last of the three main doctrines currently operational in the PLA is “People’s
War”. This is by far the oldest of the three doctrines and has been modified to encompass
the realities of 21st century warfare. Dating back to the 1930s when fighting the Japanese
in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the doctrine emphasized the importance of the
participation of the general population in different aspects of warfare. Much of this
remains true today; it essentially calls for the “mobilization of the Chinese population and
the country’s natural and industrial resources in times of emergency to support the armed
forces.” 114 A publication by the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns elaborates on
how this doctrine is put into practice:
“…within the battle zone, the financial potential, mechanical maintenance capability,
loading and unloading transportation capability, medical first--aid ability, in addition to
the quantity and quality of the population, would all constitute extremely direct influence
115
towards the logistics, equipment technical support and personnel replenishment.”
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Although the CCP recognizes three doctrines and accompanying strategies officially, it is
clear that its foreign weapons acquisitions and indigenous development heavily favor
“Local War under Conditions of Informatization” and its A2/AD component.
Acquisitions and Indigenous Production
The PLA has pursued the purchase or the development of weapons systems which
can properly fulfill its A2/AD requirements. Key imports have been: 300+ Sukhoi fighter
jets, 12 Kilo class submarines, four Sovremenny-class missile cruisers (See Figures 1&2),
and about 1000 S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries which are able to
simultaneously track over 100 targets.116 The submarines come equipped with state of the
art anti-ship missiles (ASM) such as the SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-27 Sizzler against
which the U.S. Navy has yet to find an effective way to defend its aircraft carriers.117 The
SAM batteries and Sukhoi fighters are aimed at deterring aerial incursions into Chinese
territory or area of engagements. Subsequently, these weapons have become the
centerpieces of the PLA acquisition program in recent years due to the fact that they are
among the most modern platforms currently deployed by the military.
One of the key indigenous programs that have been successful is the Yuan-class
diesel submarine. In order to give some perspective on the capabilities of the submarine,
Jane’s Navy International, an intelligence analyst company, reported that the Yuan-class
submarines may be equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP). Air-independent
Propulsion allows diesel submarines to remain submerged for weeks at a time, which
116
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decreases their chance of detection by enemy forces.118 Technology such as the AIP is
very advanced and only the most modern militaries have such systems employed in their
services. The area-deniability factor of this weapon is that it poses a threat to any ships
passing through their operational zone. Together with the Kilo and Yuan class submarines,
the Chinese navy currently operates 60 submarines and has plans to expand its fleet in the
coming years, greatly increasing its A2/AD capabilities.119
The PLA has also set up an extensive conventional cruise and ballistic missile
capability to make up for its lack of aerial and naval superiority. By making use of its
significant geographical advantage as a continental power and its capable missile
development programs, China has produced an impressive stockpile of short to long
range missiles capable of striking American assets on land, air and sea.120 The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated that by 2006 China had over 900 SRBMs and was
increasing its inventory annually at a rate of more than 100. These SRBMs have a range
of less than 1000km but effectively cover most of the Chinese coast and will be
complemented in the future by mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) capable of reaching
targets 3000km away.121 Coupled with the S-300 SAM systems, the Sunburn, and Sizzler
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ASM, the PLA is quickly creating an effective A2/AD umbrella which can potentially
impede the freedom of movement by the U.S. and Japan in the event of a conflict.

Figure 1. Kilo-Class Submarine.
Source Naval-Technology.com: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/kilo877/kilo8772.html

Figure 2. Sovremenny-Class destroyer.
Source Naval-Technology.com: http://www.navaltechnology.com/projects/sovremenny/sovremenny5.html
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The Assassins Mace
The term Assassin’s Mace emanates from Chinese folklore about a hero who
wields such a weapon in order to overcome a more powerful opponent. In military terms
it is strategy that calls for the capacity to “rapidly and decisively seize the initiative and
turn the tide to one’s advantage when confronting a conventionally superior foe.” 122
Assassin’s Mace is essentially an extension of A2/AD but is more focused on
asymmetrical and unconventional approaches to warfare. The core concept of keeping the
enemy away from key interests encapsulated by A2/AD is augmented by the capability to
land a decisive blow on the enemy should they wish to engage. In this regard Assassin’s
Mace also encompasses indigenous research and development of weapons that can
effectively deter the opponent or strike a decisive blow should tensions escalate to armed
conflict.123 Because the focus of these weapons is modern regional militaries, particularly
the U.S. and Japan, China has sought to identify their key military assets that while
powerful are also very vulnerable; assets like satellites, command and control centers,
American Nimitz-class super carriers and Wasp-class Landing Helicopter Docks or
Japanese helicopter destroyers like the Hyuga and Izumo-class Helicopter Destroyers.
Key Assassin’s Mace-type platforms that have been identified by the Pentagon
have been Anti Satellite weapons (ASAT), sea mines, and conventional ballistic missiles.
Regarding ASAT technology, the PLA proved in 2007 that it is capable of taking down
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satellites with missiles. The PLA also appears to be “developing other kinetic and
directed-energy (e.g., lasers, high-powered microwave, and particle beam weapons)
technologies for ASAT missions. Foreign and indigenous systems also give China the
capability to jam common satellite communications bands and GPS receivers.”124 Weapons
like these could potentially blind the U.S. and Japan in the event of an armed conflict and,
therefore, have the potential to change its course.
The PLA Navy also has a current estimated inventory of 50,000-100,000 mines of
which there are over thirty varieties. These range from traditional moored or drifting mines to
sophisticated remote controlled and rising mines. These mines can be directed to a location
and sit at the bottom of the ocean waiting for an acoustic or magnetic signature to trigger its
launching mechanism. Rising mines are particularly troubling because they are essentially
torpedoes that rise from the bottom of the ocean to strike the unsuspecting target. These
mines are said to be very effective anti-submarine weapons.125 Coupled with the fact these
mines are much more difficult to sweep and that the U.S. does not currently have significant
mine countermeasure assets in the region, the PLA Navy hopes that in the event of a conflict
it can swiftly lock American vessels out of its operational zone in order to achieve its goal.126
However, it is important to note that Japan currently operates 26 mine countermeasures
(MCM) vessels, which is indicative of its concern with China’s vast sea mine arsenal. It is

124

“Annual Report To Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2011.” Department of Defense, 2011 Pg. 37.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf
(Accessed November 10, 2013)

125

Andrew S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, “Chinese Mine Warfare:
A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability,” Naval War College, 2009, Pg. 11& 20,
http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-StudiesInstitute/Publications/documents/CMS3_Mine-Warfare.aspx (Accessed November 13, 2013)

126

Ibid. Pg. 47-48

50

also “illustrative of Tokyo’s strong commitment to MCM that all these craft are of 1980s or
newer vintage.”127 This essentially makes Japan the best-equipped state in the region to meet
any potential PLA mine-laying operation.
The last piece of China’s Assassin’s Mace arsenal that is publicly known is the
development of the Dong Feng-21D (DF-21D) ASBM. They PLA has prioritized ballistic

and cruise missile programs to serve as a deterrent to formal Taiwanese independence or
any involvement by outside forces in a mainland-Taiwan conflict. The DF-21D is a
notable platform because this missile is theoretically capable of attacking large naval
vessels such as the American Nimitz-class aircraft carriers or the Japanese Hyuga and
Izumo class helicopter destroyer. The missile has maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV)
technology which would allow the warhead to maneuver or change its trajectory once it
reenters the atmosphere, thereby enhancing its evasiveness. This technology would
increase the missile’s survivability by making it more effective against existing defensive
countermeasures.128
The Assassin’s Mace line of weaponry is exotic and has been product of a
conscious understanding that China’s capabilities do not yet match those of the U.S. and
Japan. Although it appears that China does not seem intent on challenging American
supremacy globally, it is concerned that the U.S. and Japan may challenge its position as
a regional power in the coming decades. However, most of the details regarding
Assassin’s Mace weapons remain classified. Nevertheless, the Pentagon, the Japanese
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Ministry of Defense, and other analysts continue to monitor their development closely
because of their potential to alter the status quo.
China’s South China Sea Policy
As mentioned above, China claims sovereignty over the entirety of the SCS land
features. It currently occupies the following 7 reefs in the Spratly archipelago:
(International name/Chinese name)
1. Cuarteron Reef or Huayang Reef
2. Fiery Cross Reef or Yongshu Reef
3. Hughes Reef or Dongmen Reef
4. Gaven Reefs or Nanxun Reef and Xinan Reef
5. Johnson South Reef or Chigua Reef
6. Mischief Reef or Meiji Reef
7. Subi Reef or Zhubi Reef 129
The PRC maintains military facilities in all 7 of these features. Most installations have
concrete buildings, helipads, antennas, search lights, radars, and naval guns.130
Furthermore, China has occupied the Paracels since its eviction of Vietnamese forces in
1974. In the Paracel Islands China has established the Sansha administrative city on
Woody Island, known as Yongxing in Chinese. Nearly 1000 residents currently live there
and the PRC plans to build:
“a municipal office complex, an airport expansion, a military supply facility and supply
hub for fishery and maritime surveillance vessels. It also intends to build a new port, a
desalination plant capable of handling 1,000 tonnes of sea water daily, a 500-kilowatt
solar power station, as well as "environmentally friendly" rubbish and waste-water
treatment facilities.”131
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China hopes that the settlement on the island will demonstrate control of the area and its
inhabitability in order to cement its claims (See Figure 3).132

Figure 3. Woody Island. Source Google Maps

Another effort to exert control of the SCS has been the imposition of fishing bans
in the area since 1999.133 These bans have been enforced by Chinese maritime agencies
which habitually interdict fishing vessels from other states, particularly Vietnam and the
Philippines. Some of these encounters have led to confrontations where Chinese vessels
have opened fire on foreign fishermen, as was the case in March 20, 2013 when Chinese
authorities fired upon Vietnamese trawlers, setting one ablaze. 134 For their part the
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Philippines and Vietnam have consistently defied these bans, and in the case of the
Philippines, instituted their own fishing ban to counter the Chinese. While China claims
that these bans are merely efforts to replenish fish stocks in the area, neither the
Philippines nor Vietnam believe that China is acting on the grounds of food security but
rather to further cement its control of the SCS135
China’s growing military capabilities, aided by foreign weapon acquisitions and
domestic production, allow it to project power further beyond its territorial waters.
Although the PRC has opted to maintain its newer and more capable military vessels
away from disputed zones, its civilian maritime enforcement agencies operate former
PLA Navy (PLAN) ships that are armed with guns and helicopters.136 China’s principle
maritime forces are:






“China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), under the Ministry of Land and Resources;
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), under the Ministry of Agriculture;
China Coast Guard (CCG), a paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) force
under the Ministry of Public Security;
Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) and China Rescue and Salvage (CRS),
under the Ministry of Transportation;
Anti-Smuggling Maritime Police, under the General Administration of
Customs”137
Besides operating former PLAN vessels, these agencies are supported by aircraft

and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These official vessels and aircrafts augment PLA
enforcement capabilities in asserting control over the disputed areas. Analysts contend
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that China’s improved naval facilities provide China with an expanded range of coercive
tools that can be deployed against rival claimants. As a result, many argue that China is
pursuing a strategy of maintaining the status quo while simultaneously “strengthening
actual control of the waters surrounding the disputed reefs and islands, including through
official patrols in rival claimants’ territorial waters.” 138 Its substantial submarine and
subsurface vessel capabilities allow China to patrol vast stretches of disputed territory in
a way that other rival claimants are unable to challenge with their current capabilities.
China has also been pursuing the purchase of longer range fighters to patrol the
SCS area. The PLA’s current fleet of SU-27s is only capable of conducting quick flyovers of contested territory in the SCS due to their limited internal fuel capacity, its
inability to carry external fuel tanks, and the lack of external fueling capabilities.139 The
fighter they are currently pursuing is the Russian-made SU-35 fighter. The SU-35 is
among the best non-stealth fighters in the world and possesses a much longer effective
range than its SU-27 predecessor. Its internal fuel capacity alone is 20% greater than its
predecessor. More significantly, the SU-35 can carry external fuel tanks; allowing it to
loiter in contested areas for much longer periods of time. It is also important to point out
that “the Su-35, would likely be able to outfly and outshoot any Philippine or Vietnamese
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aircraft (or surface vessel for that matter) largely rendering competing territorial claims a
moot point.”140
The SCS is important to China not only because of its energy reserves or marine
resources but also because it is a strategic location traversed by China's SLOC and can
potentially serve as a buffer zone. A buffer zone in the SCS would allow the PLA to
monitor the naval movements of potential rivals like the U.S. and Japan in the region.
This would essentially help China protect the mainland more effectively, particularly the
coastal regions where most of China’s industry and commerce reside.141
Chapter III: Japanese Normalization
Background
Japan has been undergoing a ‘normalization’ process for the past two decades.
However, in order to make the claim Japan has been undergoing a process of
‘normalization’; one must first address the implications of that claim. Japan is the only
sovereign country in the world which has relinquished its rights to wage war or maintain
armed forces. Furthermore, for a country that remains an economic powerhouse despite
two decades of stagnation and sluggish recovery, Japan has been a bit player in the
provision of regional and global security. 142 These two points make the case for
‘abnormality’ because there is no precedent for either of these things being attributed to
any country in history. There has been no country that has willingly given up its right to
wage war; and, while the Japanese were forced to accept the current constitution after
140
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their defeat in the aftermath of World War II, their continued adherence to Article IX is
arguably self-imposed. Japan is well within its rights to amend or do away with its
current constitution outright if it so desired. Additionally, there is no precedent for a
country with such formidable global economic weight to not be directly engaged in
providing for regional and global security.143
It does appear, however, that Japan has slowly begun to turn the corner on some
of these issues. Since the aftermath of the first Gulf War, Japan has sought a more active
role in peacekeeping operations around the world and has continued to expand on the
roles of the JSDF. These changes are welcomed by the United States which has been
actively trying to get Japan to become more engaged in regional security matters as well
as to provide more capabilities for itself while the U.S. has been preoccupied with the
War on Terror. Nonetheless, the movement towards ‘normalization’ by Japan is seen with
a wary eye by some of its neighbors, particularly China. The historical legacy between
the two countries has created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion between the two
countries. As a result, any move taken by Japan towards ‘normalization’ is perceived to
be akin to remilitarization and a return to the imperial past by many Chinese officials.
The source of much of the abnormality of Japan has been its pacifist constitution, more
specifically Article IX.
Article IX
The main constraint on the JSDF is Article IX in the Japanese constitution. The
constitution is also well known as the ‘pacifist constitution’ among scholars because both
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the preamble and the famous Article IX express explicit principles of pacifism. For
example, the preamble contains these passages:
“We, the Japanese people …resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors
of war through the action of government….
We … desire peace for all time … and we have determined to preserve our security and
144
existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”

Following the same line of thinking, Article IX legally establishes the pacifist ideology
by which Japan has operated since the constitution’s adoption in 1947 through these two
paragraphs:
1.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of
force as a means of settling international disputes.

2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
145
state will not be recognized.

The first paragraph is interpreted to mean that while Japan renounces war as a
sovereign right, it is authorized to defend itself. Most legal scholars and government
officials in Japan agree with this line of thinking, although some argue that even wars of
self-defense are explicitly prohibited. The second paragraph is more contentious because
the majority of scholars agree that under this paragraph Japan is denied a “standing
military or quasi-military force. The only ways to resist foreign aggression are through
police power and an ad hoc militia (citizens with weapons).”146 Under this definition the
existence of the JSDF is in clear violation of the constitution. As a result, the government
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has opted to construe the JSDF in a different manner than the “war potential” referred to
in Article IX, paragraph 2. The reasoning being that since the first paragraph does not
forbid the right to self-defense, it is within the states’ right to establish standing forces in
order to provide for self-defense. The government believes that so long as the established
forces are not greater than the minimally required for self-defense, they do not constitute
“war potential”.147
It is with this in mind that the JSDF was created in 1954. Their primary purpose
was to provide for the security of Japan in the event of an invasion. 148 Despite their
creation, however, the JSDF remained constrained by the legal ambiguity surrounding
Article IX. One of the biggest points of contention arises from the fact that Article IX
forbids the Japanese from participating in collective defense treaties; meaning that Japan
is not allowed participate in a war even if it is to assist an ally. This is important because
Japan signed a Security Treaty with the U.S. in 1951. The treaty has been revised a
number of times but the essence remained the same until 1997 (which will be discussed
in further detail below). The main tenets of the treaty since 1960 have been for Japan to
provide the U.S with sites for the establishment of bases as well as to maintain an
adequate force for self-defense (the JSDF). In return, the U.S. would provide Japan with
financial assistance, military protection, and coverage under the American nuclear
umbrella.149 The implication is that in the event that Japan came under attack, the United
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States would have to assist Japan in the defense of their territory whereas if the U.S. came
under attack, Japan would not be required to respond.
The Normalization Process
The ‘normalization’ of the JSDF has been a gradual process that is still ongoing.
There have been a number of factors that have compelled Japan to pursue ‘normalization’.
These factors have been both internal and external. On the eve of the first Gulf War,
Japan was asked to participate in the coalition to liberate Kuwait. The restrictions of
Article IX paralyzed Japanese officials and the decision was made to simply allocate $13
billion to fund the United Nations’ campaign in the Persian Gulf. Japanese officials were
humiliated to see their country’s monetary contribution, as a substitute for military
support, turned into a source of contempt by other countries.150
The JSDF are prohibited by law from being deployed beyond Japanese territory.
Consequently, in order for the JSDF to be dispatched outside of Japanese territory,
legislation must be passed through the Diet. Immediately after the end of the Gulf War in
1992, Japan enacted the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace Keeping
Operations and Other Operations (PKO Law). This law allows for the JSDF to participate
in U.N.-sanctioned peace-keeping operations albeit under serious restrictions. The JSDF
troops deployed on these missions are not to be deployed in combat zones. Their role
primarily revolves around providing medical care, constructing roads, and running
refugee camp operations.151 The passing of this law has been noted by many to be the
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starting point of Japan’s movement towards ‘normalization’. For the first time since
WWII Japanese troops were being deployed overseas and participating in global security
affairs. Since passing of the PKO, Japan has deployed JSDF units to “Cambodia,
Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda and Honduras.”152
In 1996 Japan and the U.S. began talks on establishing new guidelines for the
alliance. By 1997 the two countries had agreed to a new set of provisions which would
reaffirm the bilateral defense cooperation between the two countries as well provide for
breaking new ground. Of particular importance is Part V of the guidelines which calls for
“Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan That Will Have An Important
Influence on Japan’s Peace And Security, stipulates details of Japan’s cooperation with
the U.S. military.”153 This provision is not only constitutionally problematic for Japan
due to the implications that Japan may have to serve alongside the U.S. during a conflict
in the region, but also for neighboring countries that see this development as potentially
threatening to their interests. As mentioned above, China is especially concerned that this
provision makes way for Japanese participation in a conflict between China and the U.S.
over Taiwan.
Simultaneously with political movement towards ‘normalization,’ the Japanese
public has undergone a dramatic shift throughout the 1990s in its opinion over
‘normalizing’ the JSDF. As a result, many support the amending of the constitution in
order to make the JSDF unquestionably legal under Japanese law. For the first time since
the end of WWII polls showed that nearly 60% of the Japanese population approved of
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amending the constitution.154 This approval has been accredited to the overall satisfaction
of the Japanese public with the JSDF’s participation in peace-keeping operations around
the world as well as more localized regional threats that they perceive. Their immediate
concern has been North Korea and its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Repeated
missile tests that have violated Japanese airspace have prompted the JSDF to heavily
invest in BMD. This has been a joint venture between the U.S. and Japan. The BMD
program utilizes a number of platforms such as early warning radars, Aegis-equipped
cruisers, and Patriot missile batteries to track and destroy incoming missile threats.155
However, while North Korea presents an immediate threat to Japan’s security interests,
Japanese officials agree that China will become their primary rival in the mid to longterm. China’s continued military modernization and lack of defense budget transparency
has provoked fear in Japan over a potential clash with China in the future. Consequently,
more and more people in Japan are becoming concerned with security issues and
therefore more supportive of the ongoing ‘normalization’ of the JSDF.
As a result of these internal and external pressures to ‘normalize’ the JSDF, the
Ministry of Defense (MoD) was created in 2007 to replace the Japanese Defense Agency
which had been founded in 1954.156 The elevation of the defense department from agency
to ministry level allows for more power concentration and influence in security policies.
Since the creation of the MoD, there have been active debates on lifting export bans on
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military equipment in order to provide Japanese weapons manufacturers some economies
of scale when producing weapons. This would allow the Japanese military complex to
remain competitive and profit from technology transfers with other developed countries.
The export ban makes indigenous weapons production very costly and makes these
companies increasingly unable to innovate because they cannot conduct business with
foreign defense firms.157 This is a critical shortcoming for Japanese firms because other
countries with developed military industrial complexes such as Japan are able to reduce
costs by exporting variants of their products to other countries.
As a result, in 2011 Japan eased its export ban and set forth a new set of criteria
for arms sales and production. The new criteria for transfers of defense equipment
emphasize the need to cooperate with the U.S. and other countries in the development of
defense equipment. It also allows for the sale of military equipment for peaceful uses on a
case by case basis. Defense equipment transferred to another party cannot be used for
purposes outside of the agreed framework between Japan and the recipient. Lastly, no
weapons sales will be made to conflict areas where the provision of military equipment
could aggravate the situation.158 This relaxation of the ban will allow Japan to participate
in the production line of the Lockheed F-35 stealth fighter.
“Japan said it plans to spend some ¥1.6 trillion ($20.8 billion) on the program over the
next 20 years, and hopes to offset some of the costs of procuring and partially producing
the aircraft domestically by exporting components to other F-35 buyers. The rising cost
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associated with producing military hardware that could technically be used only in Japan
was a major factor prompting the export-ban reassessment.”159

Former Prime Minister Noda approved a decision to buy 42 of the stealth fighters. Tokyo
expects to win some contracts to produce components for the fighter right in Japan. It is
expected that “Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., IHI Corp. and Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
will participate in production of the planes, the defense ministry said.”160
Increasing public support for the amendment of the constitution has empowered
legislators to pursue a draft on a number of new amendments to the constitution. These
amendments would provide for the legality of the JSDF under Japanese law. Other
provisions allow for the right to collective self-defense which would enable Japan to aid
American troops in a combat capacity rather than simply provide rear-lines support.
These changes would also allow Japan to participate in peace-keeping activities without
needing new legislation every time the JSDF is deployed overseas. The draft was released
in 2005 but has not been put up for a vote as of yet due to the political deadlock in the
Diet.161
Nevertheless, the pressing security issues that Japan now perceives it is facing
have prompted some reforms. In 2013 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved legislation to
create a National Security Council (NSC) based on the American system. This new body
would replace the existing nine-member Security Council and provide a more centralized
decision-making body composed of the prime minister, the chief cabinet secretary, the
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minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of defense.162 “The reduced membership is
intended to facilitate prompt decision-making in national security and crisis
management.”163 Another objective of the new NSC is to make the NSC a ‘headquarters’
for the numerous intelligence agencies that are spread out among the different ministries.
This would allow for better communication and information sharing among the different
bodies and subsequently facilitate better policy making during a crisis.164 For the moment
the ‘normalization’ of Japan has been limited to the acquisition of weapons and
capabilities that push the scope of the original mission of the JSDF. In essence, Japan has
been acquiring more offensive weaponry as well as power-projection capabilities.
Political ‘normalization’ appears to be lagging behind the military establishment,
although recent overtures in Southeast Asia point to a more active and engaging Japan in
the political and security spheres.
Capabilities of the JSDF
Although relatively small, the JSDF maintains a level qualitative superiority
exceeded only by the United States.165 With an average spending of over $50 billion
annually, Japan ranks fifth in the world in total military spending; surpassed by the
United States, China, Russia and the United Kingdom. 166 These figures indicate that
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despite having a pacifist constitution, Japan has been able to develop one of the most
powerful military forces in the world. Consistent with the ‘normalization’ process, the
JSDF has been acquiring weapon systems that go beyond the scope of self-defense and
into the area of power-projection capabilities. Every service appears to be moving
forwards with acquisitions that make power projection a reality for Japan.
Ground Forces
For its part “the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) established a Central
Readiness Group (CRG) in 2007, combining the elite 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter
Brigade, 101st Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Unit and the Special Operations
Group (SOG).”167 The CRG serves as a rapid-reaction force which allows Japan to react
immediately in the event of a terrorist attack or other internal crises. These forces are also
responsible for training troops headed for overseas deployment. 168 This indicates that
Japan is progressively enhancing its capability to deploy forces overseas at a moment’s
notice in the same manner that other modern powers are equipped to do. This capability
enhances Japan’s power-projection capabilities significantly as most militaries in the
world, with the exception of modern western forces, are not equipped to deploy overseas
at a moment’s notice in the event that a crisis occurs.
The JSDF is also creating amphibious capabilities in the form of the Amphibious
Preparatory Unit (APU). The MoD budget for 2014 states that in order to
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“effectively respond to attacks on remote islets, air superiority and command of the sea
must be maintained. To rapidly deploy troops as the situation unfolds, mobile deployment
capability and amphibious capability are also important. To steadily build-up such mobile
deployment capability, consideration of the optimal deployment posture of troops and
equipment, joint transport, utilizing civilian transport capacity, creating supply bases, and
properly equipping the new amphibious unit for the amphibious mission are
important.”169

Although not explicitly named in the report, the MoD is clearly referring to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands where continued Chinese naval and aerial incursions have
become increasingly common. The 700-man APU will be formed out of the GSDF.
Japan’s MoD states that the unit will eventually reach a total of 3000 soldiers. This unit
will be based out of Sasebo, Nagasaki Prefecture in southern Japan.170 The APU could be
supplemented with the acquisition of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft that the U.S.
Marines currently operate.171 The acquisition of the Osprey would enhance mobility and
speed of the GSDF in the event that it has to respond to a physical Chinese incursion in
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Naval Forces
The Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) has engaged in the production of
vessels which clearly enhance Japan’s power-projection capabilities. The first of these
vessels is the Osumi-class landing ship tanks (LSTs) (See Figure 4). These ships have a
flat-top deck which allows it to operate a contingent of helicopters to assist in landing
operations. The ship carries Landing Craft Air Cushion-class hovercraft (LCAC) which
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can be used to ferry troops to shore as well as tanks and other armored vehicles. These
ships saw action in 1999 and 2003 when they were deployed to East Timor and Iraq
respectively. 172 The second ship class is the Hyuga-class helicopter destroyer. These
ships are classified as helicopter destroyers because, like the Osumi-class ships, they have
a flat-top deck to accommodate helicopters (See Figure 5). Unlike the Osumi, however,
the Hyuga has sub-deck hangars to store a larger contingent of aircraft. Many have
speculated that the ship is capable of launching vertical/short take-off and landing
(VSTOL) aircraft with minor modifications thus making it an aircraft carrier, an
offensive weapon which Japan is not legally allowed to operate under Article IX due to
the capabilities provided by such a vessel. The MSDF currently operates two of these
ships and plans to acquire two larger vessels.173
The first of this new class was unveiled in august 2013 and has been classified as
the Izumo-class helicopter destroyer (22DDH) (See Figure 6).
“At 250 meters (820 feet) long, and reportedly displacing 24,000 tons, the ship can carry
14 helicopters. It is the largest warship Japan has fielded since WWII, and about 50
percent bigger (in terms of displacement) than Japan’s current largest ship, the Hyugaclass helicopter destroyer.”174

Its primary mission will be anti-submarine warfare, surveillance, and to transport
personnel. 175 The unveiling sparked intense debate within China where the Chinese
Defense Ministry stated that: "We are concerned over Japan's constant expansion of its
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military equipment. Japan's Asian neighbors and the international community need to be
highly vigilant about this trend."176 Li Daguang, a professor as China’s National Defense
University of the People’s Liberation Army, stated that the Izumo was essentially a
“carrier in disguise,” noting that "Japan tops the world in terms of its anti-submarine
capability and the warship would further consolidate its advantage."177
Classifying this ship as a destroyer is purely a matter of bypassing the legality of
operating an aircraft carrier. Should this ship operate a variant of the F-35 fighter it would
automatically make this ship an aircraft carrier. The V-22 Osprey alone would be enough
to reclassify this ship since the Osprey flies like a normal aircraft once it has taken off.
The F-35 and V-22 would allow this ship to operate beyond the role of anti-submarine
warfare it was originally intended for.178 Izumo-class ships significantly increase Japan’s
naval power by providing it with real power-projection capabilities.
Japan’s powerful naval capabilities can easily complement the new APU. It
already possesses key elements for amphibious operations, notably the three Osumi-class
LSTs and the LCAC hovercrafts. Additionally, the MSDF can deploy the Hyuga and
Izumo helicopter destroyers to provide airlift during operations. 179 The MoD is also
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taking steps to strengthen command functions during amphibious operations by installing
conference equipment on the Izumo destroyers.180

Figure 4. Osumi-Class LST. Source Military-Today.com:
http://www.military-today.com/navy/oosumi_class.htm
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Figure 5. Hyuga-Class Helicopter Destroyer. Source Military-Today.com:
http://www.military-today.com/navy/hyuga_class.htm

Figure 6. Izumo-Class Helicopter Destroyer. Source Military-Today.com:
http://www.military-today.com/navy/izumo_class.htm
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Air Forces
The Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) has also been keen on expanding their role
and providing for more power-projection capabilities by acquiring tanker aircraft. The
ASDF currently operates four Boeing 767 tankers and plans to double that capacity in
coming years. Tanker aircraft provide the capability to perform in-flight refueling and
therefore increase the range of fighter planes and interceptors. While the legal rationale
for acquiring these tankers has been to provide for more efficient use of pilot time and
allow aircraft to remain airborne during poor weather conditions which make landing
difficult, it is clear that having in-flight refueling capabilities increases the ASDF’s
offensive and power-projection potential. 181 Not many countries have the expertise to
operate in-flight refueling operations; this makes Japan’s ability to do so an important
step towards ‘normalizing’ the JSDF.
These are but a number of the many acquisitions that Japan has been making as it
continues to push for further ‘normalization’ of its forces. Each branch has continued to
maintain a qualitative superiority to their regional competitors as current conditions do
not allow for increased quantitative capabilities. These programs not only allow Japan to
more efficiently participate in global crisis situations but also allow it to maintain a
certain level of expertise in its defense industry.
Japan’s South China Sea Policy
The ‘normalization’ process currently underway in Japan has a number of security
implications, particularly in regards to the ECS and the SCS. The increase in power-
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projection capabilities by the JSDF is alarming for many Chinese officials who contend
that Japan is working with the U.S. on a containment strategy against China. They
validate this belief by pointing to the revised guidelines of 1997 in which Japan could
assist the U.S. in security matters in the region. The fact that Japan has refused to rule out
involvement in a Taiwanese contingency unnerves Chinese officials.182 There continues
to be a sense of mutual suspicion on both sides which makes positive security relations
between them extremely difficult.
However, among Southeast Asian countries, Japan’s increasing willingness to
challenge China on the ECS has been a welcome development. The Philippine Foreign
Affairs secretary stated that his “country would welcome a rearmed Japan as a balancing
factor in the region.”183 The Minister’s statement reveals that despite the fact that Japan
led a brutal occupation of the Philippines during WWII, China’s increasingly assertive
posture in the region has changed the political calculations of the country. The
Vietnamese have also been active in strengthening ties with Japan in order to counter
China. Nguyen Tan Dung, the Vietnamese Defense Minister, stated that "The relationship
between the two countries is extremely important."184
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For its part Japan has been active in Southeast Asia, particularly in the provision
of training and hardware to regional coastguards.185 “The Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) funds the Coast Guard’s seminars to train maritime authorities in
Southeast Asia, and Japan’s aid is critical in helping to create maritime patrol authority
where local capacity is lacking.”186 This is especially true in the case of the Philippines.
The purpose of this aid has been to strengthen the maritime capabilities of the SCS
littoral countries in order to improve the safety of the SCS due to the chronic issues of
piracy that plague the area. To that end, Japan provided the seed money for the AntiPiracy Center located in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.187 Japan has also been providing
coastguard ships to countries in the SCS region. In 2006 Japan gave Indonesia 3 patrol
vessels.188 Tokyo also has plans to provide the Philippines and Vietnam with a number of
coast guard ships in the near future. (This will be discussed further below).
Besides promoting maritime safety in the SCS, Japan has begun to participate in a
number of naval exercises in the area. In 2011 Japan joined the United States and
Australia in a SCS drill. The MSDF sent a destroyer to join ships from the other two
navies off the coast of Brunei. These drills incorporated communications training and
other measures. In a statement the MoD said that "The exercise is aimed at enhancing
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tactical skills of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and strengthening relations with the
participating navies."189 In a more recent development, the U.S. and the Philippines have
considered inviting Japan to the annual U.S.-Philippine Balikatan exercises. These
exercises focus on humanitarian relief as well as traditional military training and help
provide better coordination between the two allies. Philippine Army Major General
Virgilio Domingo, who was the director of the 2013 Balikatan exercises, said that the
expansion of the joint military drills into a “multilateral military engagement will be
beneficial to troops of participating countries.”190
All of these measures are indicative that as Japan ‘normalizes’ it will seek a larger
stake in regional security. This will be matched by a more assertive China as a result of
its growing economic and military clout. If mutual suspicion continues to plague the
security relations between these two powers, the probability for heightened tensions and
possible clashes will be high in the ECS and the SCS. It is clear that Japan has been more
willing to confront what it perceives as Chinese incursions into its territory around the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It is also clear that Japan perceives China’s increasingly
assertive activities in the SCS as detrimental to its national interests. These developments
have prompted Japan to seek a more prominent political and security role in Southeast
Asia in order to balance China.
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Chapter IV: Republic of the Philippines Case Study
Background
Located on the east end of the SCS, the Philippines is among the claimants to a
number of features on the Spratly Island group. The Philippines had been a colony of the
Spanish Empire from the 16th century until 1898 when control of the island was ceded to
the United States after the Spanish lost the Spanish-American War. In 1942 the islands
fell under Japanese control as Japan was expanding its empire through Southeast Asia. It
would not be until 1946 that the Republic of the Philippines acquired its independence
from the United States.191 Almost immediately the Philippines became an active claimant
in the SCS.
The Philippines lays claim to 53 islands, islets, reefs, shoals, cays, rocks, and
atolls with an area of 64,976 square miles; the largest of these is called Thitu Island.
Collectively these features are known as the KIG by the Philippines.192 At the moment
the Philippines controls 7 islands and 3 reefs in the Spratly Island group. These are:
(Philippine name/International name)
1. Kota or Loaita Island
2. Lawak or Nansham Island
3. Likas or West York Island
4. Panata or Lamkian Cay
5. Pag-asa or Thitu Island
6. Parola or North East Cay
7. Patag or Flat Island
8. Rizal or Commodore Reef
9. Balagtas Reef or Irvin Reef
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10. Ayungin Reef or Second Thomas Shoal193
As mentioned above, the most significant island occupied by the Philippines is Pag-asa or
Thitu Island, as it is internationally known. The island houses a naval detachment as well
as a runway that is maintained by the 570th Composite Tactical Wing of the Philippine
Air Force (PAF). Pag-asa is also the only SCS feature occupied by the Philippines that
has civilian residents, with at least five families residing on the island. Here lies the main
seat of the Municipality of Kalaya’an. Besides the military structures, the island also has
sports facilities, a municipal hall, a village hall, and a police station (See Figure 7).194
The SCS is of significant strategic importance to the Philippines for a number of
reasons, particularly its energy and marine resources as well as its strategic location as a
main artery of trade. Together, these reasons provide justification for the Philippines’
active diplomatic and military policy in the region.

Figure 7: Thitu Island. Source Google Maps
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Energy Resources
The International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that the Philippines annual energy
needs in 2007 was 40 million tons of oil; a figure that is expected to grow at an average
of 2.8% annually until 2030. In 2010 oil accounted for nearly 35% of the Philippines’
energy consumption. This percentage translates to 282,000 barrels per day (bpd). 195
Considering the fact that the Philippines’ own domestic production of oil is roughly
23,000 bpd, coupled with the fact that its own domestic policy towards its Muslim
population has led to tensions with the Arab world and Indonesia, Philippine energy
security is questionable. As a result, the Philippines finds itself in great need of raising
the production of its own fields in Malampay and Palawan, both of which are located in
the SCS.196 Furthermore, the Philippines hopes to exploit the resources in Reed Bank
which is said to have significant oil and natural gas deposits. However, in order to
achieve this, it must maintain control of the Second Thomas Shoal which serves as a
strategic gateway to Reed Bank. The Second Thomas Shoal is home to about 10
Philippine marines who are based on a World War II-era ship that was intentionally
grounded on the shoal. This strategic location has come under direct Chinese pressure in
recent years as Chinese surveillance ships have attempted to block Philippine vessels
attempting to resupply the marines.197
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Marine Resources
Exploitation of marine resources in the SCS is also of vital importance to the
Philippine state due to its heavy reliance on fishing both for consumption and as a source
of income. According to a study performed by the Philippine Department of Agriculture:
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DA-BFAR), commercial and municipal
fishing brought in catches valued 67.4 billion Philippine Pesos (~$1.4 billion) in 2001.
Exports of tuna, crab and octopus were valued at 10.7 billion Philippine Pesos (~$237
million) in the same year.198 By 2011 fishery exports were valued at $871 million.199 The
DA-BFAR report goes on to state that fish are considered a staple food in the Philippine
diet, contributing 12.3% of the total food consumption of Filipinos annually. Fish
contributes 22.4% of the total protein intake of the average Filipino and is 56% of the
animal protein consumed in the Philippines yearly.200 This report is indicative of the fact
that access to marine resources in the SCS is vital to the food security and economic wellbeing of the Philippines.
Strategic Value
The Philippines also has strategic interests in the region which are motivated by
two factors: freedom of navigation and international awareness. Since the Philippines is
one of the only two archipelagic states in the region, the second being Indonesia, it is
heavily dependent on the freedom of navigation in the SCS. The country has a total
198
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coastline measuring 17,500 km, of which 1,200 face directly towards the SCS. 201
Furthermore, over 41,000 ships pass through the SCS annually, making the SLOC vital to
the economic wellbeing of the country.202 This is highlighted by the fact that roughly
20,000 commercial vessels navigate Philippine waters annually.203 The second factor is
directly linked to the Philippine territorial claims in the SCS. This is due to the fact that:
“shippers and mariners do not use the Philippine sea lanes as extensively as the Strait of
Malacca and the South China because voyages in the Philippine waters will take longer.
Thus, the Philippines has to pursue its claims in the busy waterways of the Spratlys to
promote its navigational rights.”204

This has inevitably led to more direct confrontations with China in the SCS.
Sino-Philippine Disputes
The security relation between China and the Philippines has come to be
dominated by the competing territorial claims they have in the Spratly Islands. These
disputes escalated dramatically in 1995 when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
discovered that the PLA had occupied Mischief Reef and had erected wooden structures
on the reef.205 This would be the China’s first major occupation in the SCS since its
eviction of Vietnam from the Paracels during Cold War.206 This bold move by China was
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facilitated by the fact that the after the Cold War ended, the U.S. and the Philippines
could not agree on negotiations over the future of American military bases in the country.
As a result, by 1992 the last American “service personnel had been withdrawn from the
Philippines.”207 This essentially reinforces Buzan and Waever’s assertion that the end of
the Cold War provided China with more freedom of action. 208 Coupled with the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines and American statements of neutrality
regarding the SCS issue, emboldened the Chinese to take action.
These events led the Philippine government to believe that despite the sympathy it
received from other countries regarding the confrontation in Mischief Reef, the issue
would remain a bilateral problem.209 Repeated confrontations would occur throughout the
1990s placing further strain on Sino-Philippine relations. There would be a relatively
quiet period during the early 2000s as a result of China’s “charm offensive.” However, by
2009 the number of confrontations would flare up creating heightened tensions in the
region once again.210 The most significant of the most recent clashes has been over the
Scarborough Shoal; an area which both countries claim.
The incident began in April 2012 when a Philippine surveillance aircraft spotted
five Chinese vessels in the lagoon of the shoal. Upon dispatching a naval ship to
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investigate the Chinese vessels, the Philippine claimed that the fishermen were poaching
“species protected under Philippines law and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna.”211 Two Chinese surveillance vessels soon
arrived at the site and interposed themselves between the Philippine frigate and the
fishing vessels. Both countries have protested each other’s actions although the
Philippines was first to withdraw from the area.212 In the aftermath China has maintained
a number of vessels in the area, although it has not interfered with Philippine fishing
boats operating in and around the shoal.213
The West Philippine Sea
Heightened tensions over the SCS disputes have seen the rise of nationalism in
both China and the Philippines. Each side taking unilateral measures to counter the other
in the form of fishing bans, as discussed above, or by renaming the area as the Philippines
has recently done. Through Administrative Order No. 29, Philippine President Benigno
Aquino III has renamed the SCS as the “West Philippine Sea.”214 President Aquino stated
that the Philippines has the “inherent power and right to designate its maritime areas.”215
Despite Chinese protestations that the move violates the international standardization of
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geographic names, and that the name South China Sea is internationally recognized even
by the Philippines, Aquino directed the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority (NAMRIA) to begin producing maps and charts of the Philippines reflecting
the name change.216 The Order stated that the Philippines
“shall deposit, at the appropriate time, a copy of this Order enclosing the official map
reflecting the West Philippines Sea with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and
notify accordingly relevant international organizations, such as the International
Hydrographic Organization and the United Nations Conference on the Standardization of
Geographical Names.”217

This unilateral move is not bound to make any significant changes to the status
quo but it reflects the surging nationalist fervor that has come to the forefront as a
result of these disputes.
AFP Modernization
The withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines in 1992 and the Chinese
occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 proved just how far the AFP had atrophied. The
Philippines air force found itself with a mere five F-5 fighters, while the navy possessed a
single frigate, nine offshore patrol vessels and eight amphibious landing craft, all of
which are essentially WWII relics. 218 The Philippines has been among the weakest
members of ASEAN in both military capability and defense spending. 219 It currently
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spends $2.9 billion in defense annually, which is less than five out of the six claimants in
the SCS.220
In the aftermath of Chinese seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995, the Philippine
“congress introduced a defense modernization bill which called for the acquisition of
modern jet fighters and patrol vessels.”221 The new bill was titled Republic Order 7898
and it was meant to accomplish its goal in 15 years.222 The Order was to allocate $7.7
billion for the program over the span of those 15 years; however, the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis derailed the initiative.223 The result was that for the span of the 15 years
that RA 7898 remained active; only 55% of the 504 projects that were planned were
implemented. 224 However, there have been some positive developments regarding the
modernization of the AFP in recent years.
In 2012 Philippine President Aquino signed RA 10349, also known as the revised
AFP Modernization Act. 225 Following on his pledge to modernize the AFP, President
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Aquino has been true to his word. This is reflected in the fact that the government has
spent more than $395 million on AFP modernization in the first few months of his term
in contrast to the $51 million annual average of the past 15 years.226 The PAF plans to
acquire a small number F-16 fighter jets along with 6-12 Surface Attack Aircraft
(SAA)/Lead-in Fighter Training (LIFT) aircrafts. The South Korean T/A-50 is among the
top contenders. The PAF is also expected to acquire new long-range radars to enhance its
air defense capabilities.227
The navy in particular has benefited from the new modernization program. In an
address to the Navy, Aquino stated that the “Philippines would acquire two new frigates,
two helicopters capable of antisubmarine warfare, three fast vessels for coastal patrols
and eight amphibious assault vehicles by 2017.” 228 The AFP also has two ambitious
programs it would like to see fulfilled. The first is to acquire two Landing Platform Dock
(LPD) ships with a displacement of 5,000-10,000 tons. These ships would be capable of
supporting amphibious operations as well as conducting disaster relief missions. The
second program would be to purchase a submarine by 2020.229 Due to the fact that the
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Philippines does not currently operate any submarines, this would be a significant
acquisition.
The U.S. has been encouraging other allies in the region to provide the
Philippines with weapons for its AFP program. Japan in particular has been cited due to
the fact that it possesses one of the most capable navies in the region and has excess ships
it can offer to the Philippines. Additionally, Japan has significant MCM capabilities and
could provide the Philippines with some of these state of the art vessels.230 This could be
a route worthwhile exploring since MCM ships would fall within Japanese guidelines for
military weapons sales due to the fact that those vessels do not have offensive capabilities.
Japan-Philippine Relations
While Sino-Philippine relations have seen a turn for the worse since the 1990s,
Japan-Philippine relations have been on an upsurge. Japan is currently the Philippines’
largest trading partner accounting for 14.2% of the Philippines’ total trade.231 “Exports
to Japan totaled $4.767 billion while imports were valued at $3.407 billion, posting a
trade surplus of $1.359 billion.”232 This positive economic relationship was reinforced in
2006 when Japan and the Philippines signed an economic partnership agreement.233 This
agreement has facilitated investment coming from Japan as well as added support for
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Philippine workers overseas. Japan has been the biggest source of financial aid to the
Philippines, contributing $9.4 billion over the past 23 years. This contribution amounts to
51% of all foreign loans into the country.234
The free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries has also facilitated the
employment of Philippine workers in Japan, particularly in the health industry. This is
due to the fact that Japan’s aging population have raised the costs of healthcare,
something which has forced Japan to open its doors to foreign workers to care for the
elderly. Out of the 667,226 overseas foreign workers (OFW) deployed by the Philippines
around the world, 77,870 have gone to Japan. Out of that number, 68, 257 work as
domestic helpers while 7,683 were employed as professional nurses in the year 2000.235
Remittances from these OFWs in Japan are also a key source of income for the Philippine
government. These remittances have grown steadily over the years and in 2005 amounted
to roughly $300 million. This represented a significant increase from the $122 million
that was sent in 1997.236
Japan-Philippine security relations have also seen positive developments,
particularly in recent years as both countries have found a common cause against China.
Numerous summits have occurred between the two sides in an effort to expand the scope
of their bilateral relations into the security sphere. In 1998 Japan helped the Philippines
create a civilian coast guard, and has continued to provide training to its personnel ever
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since.237 In a 2011 summit between Philippine President Aquino and then Prime Minister
Noda the two agreed to dispatch JCG vessels to the Philippines in order to strengthen the
training for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The two leaders also agreed to
“promote and cooperation between their defense authorities, such as reciprocal visits
between the Chief of Staff of Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) and the
Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy, port calls in the Republic of the Philippines by
JMSDF vessels, and the holding of the Japan-Philippines Maritime Chief of Staff
Meeting.”238

Furthermore, in a similar summit in 2013 between President Aquino and Prime Minister
Abe, Japan stated that it would provide 10 patrol vessels to the PCG through its ODA
program. This would help bolster Philippine maritime patrol capabilities.239 The 10 patrol
ships are 40 meters long and are equipped with modern electronics. It is reported that two
additional larger vessels are being considered for transfer to the PCG under a similar
grant.240
In a landmark summit between Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and
Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin in 2013, the two men discussed many
topics including the importance of the rule of maritime law, the American rebalance to
Asia, and possible Japanese access to Philippine naval bases. Regarding the rule of law,
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Onodera commented that current situation in the SCS should not be changed with the use
of force; he was clearly alluding to the recent Chinese encroachment on the Scarborough
Shoal. 241 Onodera also remarked that he and Gazmin agreed that Japan and the
Philippines should work together to make the American rebalance in the region a
reality. 242 In a more significant development, Secretary Gazmin indicated that Japan
could potentially be offered access to naval bases in the Philippines in the same manner
as the United States. He said that “as far as Japan is concerned, we do welcome other
countries — particularly Japan since Japan is a strategic partner — in accordance with
our existing protocols.” 243 However, it is important to note that if the Philippine
government is serious about providing Japanese forces access to its bases, it would need
to negotiate a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in the same manner as it has done with
the United States.244
The pattern has been very clear. As the ECS and SCS disputes with China have
escalated, Japan and the Philippines have found common ground to expand their bilateral
cooperation from the economic into the security realm. The two countries share common
interests in protecting the SLOC in the SCS, and while Japan professes neutrality on the
SCS disputes, it appears that it has opted to balance against China by providing assistance
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to the Philippines in the form of monetary aid, coast guard training, and the provision of
patrol vessels. To further highlight these developments, Defense Minister Onodera
expressed his concerns with the deteriorating situation in the SCS and the potential
effects this could have on the ECS. In a telling statement to his counterpart, Defense
Secretary Gazmin, Onodera said that:
“in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, we are both facing common concerns,
and those issues of concerns should be based on the rule of law and we agreed on that.
We agreed that Japan and the Philippines, as good neighbors, to further strengthen our
defense cooperation.”245

Although it is certain that the two countries have come closer as a result of
China’s increasingly assertive policy towards its maritime territorial disputes, Japan still
hopes that ASEAN solidarity on the SCS disputes will pave the way for a united front to
China and ultimately result in a peaceful resolution to the conflict. However, in order to
make that happen, Japan feels that it must increase its security commitments in the SCS
in order to convey to both China and ASEAN that as a regional power, Japan is interested
in the amicable resolution to the disputes.246 Therefore, the growing number of economic
and defense cooperation agreements between Japan and Southeast Asian countries are
considered a tool to provide a proper balance to China and ensure a more equitable
negotiation process.
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Chapter V: Socialist Republic of Vietnam Case Study
Background
Like the Philippines, Vietnam has endured centuries of colonization by foreign
powers. However, Vietnam is the only country in Southeast Asia to have ever been part
of the Chinese Empire. This began with the annexation of the northern territories of
Vietnam by Han Imperial troops in 111 BCE. However, as the Tang Dynasty collapsed in
907 CE, the Vietnamese began a 20 year struggle that would eventually gain them
independence for the first time in nearly a thousand years.247 From this point forward
Vietnamese rulers sought to preserve their hard-won independence by accepting a
tributary status to their former colonial masters. These agreements would at times be
broken due to repeated Chinese attempts to reconquer the area during the Yuan, Ming
and Qing Dynasties; however, no invasion of Vietnam would be successful until the
French formally made it a colony in 1885. Its colonial status would be preserved until the
devastating French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The resulting Geneva conference
split the country in two at the 17th parallel, a situation which would endure until 1976. In
1976 the country was reunified to under the Socialist Vietnamese Republic (SRV).248
As previously mentioned, Vietnam lost control of the Paracels to China after a
naval battle in 1974; however, the country controls the largest number of features in the
Spratly archipelago, which it calls Truong Sa. The 21 features are:
(Vietnamese Name/International Name)
1. Da Lat or Ladd Reef
2. Dao Truong Sa or Spratly Island
247

Storey, Ian, Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security
(New York: Routledge, 2011), Pg. 101-102

248

Ibid. Pg. 102-106

91

3. Da Tay or West London Reef
4. Da Giua or Central Longdon Reef
5. Dao Dong or East London Reef
6. Dao An Bang or Amboyan Reef
7. Thuyen Chai or Barque Canada Reef
8. Da Phan Vinh or Pearson Reef
9. Bai Toc Tan or Alison Reef
10. Da Nui Le or Cornwallis South Reef
11. Da Tien Nu or Tennent Reef
12. Da Lon or Great Discovery Reef
13. Da Len Dao or Landsdowne Reef
14. Da Hi Gen
15. Dao Sinh Ton or Sin Cowe Island
16. Da Gri-san
17. Dao Nam Yet or Namyit Island
18. Dao Son Ca or Sand Cay
19. Da Nui Thi or Petley Reef
20. Dao Song Tu Tay or Southwest Cay
21. Da Nam or South Reef249
In addition to its substantial holdings in the Spratlys, Vietnam, in stark contrast to the
Philippines, has some of the most heavily fortified structures in the area. The largest
feature in the group it controls is Spratly Island proper (See Figure 8). The island has a
“solid runway, a pier, at least 35 building structures, around 20 storage tanks, at least 20
gun emplacements, at least 5 battle tanks and some parabolic disk antennas and a spoon
rest radar. In April 2009, Philippine aerial surveillance found a two newly-constructed
two-story building in the Lagos Island with 12 newly-installed light posts and 12 wind
mills.”250

Southwest Cay is also heavily fortified, sporting gun emplacements, bunkers, barracks, a
helipad, and polarized dipole array antennas.251
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Figure 8: Spratly Island proper. Source Google Maps

Much like the Philippines, Vietnam has economic and security interests in the
SCS. The SCS continues to provide a significant amount of energy for the country, and
potential reserves could all but guarantee energy security for decades to come. Likewise,
the marine resources of the SCS continue to provide a vital role in the Vietnamese
economy. Because much of Vietnam’s economic security relies on the bounty of the SCS,
it is among the most politically active in pursuing its claims in the region.
Energy Resources
Vietnam is currently one of the top oil producers in the area. State-owned
company PetroVietnam singularly accounts for 26% of Vietnams’ total production by
producing 24.4 million tons of oil annually. 252 Unfortunately oil production has been
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declining since 2004, which has motivated Vietnam to extend exploration contracts to
foreign firms in an effort to locate and exploit new fields. This has directly led to
confrontations with China over disputed areas in the SCS.
Nevertheless, there have been positive developments in recent years which could
potentially ensure Vietnamese energy security for the foreseeable future. In 2013,
successful exploration led to an increase in proven reserves from 0.6 billion barrels to 4.4
billion barrels. Much of Vietnam’s waters remain underexplored as a result of its ongoing
disputes with China, which leads the EIA to predict that further exploration may result in
larger proven reserves. This discovery places Vietnam as the third largest holder of
proven oil reserves in Asia. 253 Vietnam’s current oil consumption is estimated to be
around 387,880 bpd; a figure that is projected to grow at roughly 2.6% annually. In 2012
domestic oil production was roughly 364,000 bpd, which brings Vietnam close to energy
self-sufficiency. For the short term Vietnam is expected to remain a net oil importer due
to the fact that its current fields have already peaked, as well as the fact that its refining
capacity is only 140,000 bpd; although there are plans to expand this capacity to at least
200,000 bpd. Vietnam now faces the challenge of trying to exploit its newly discovered
reserves while simultaneously trying to deter Chinese obstruction in developing these
fields.254
The SRV is currently self-sufficient in natural gas, although it is projected to fall
short of supply by 2025. With 24.7 tcf of proven natural gas reserves, Vietnam is not

253

“Vietnam: Overview/Data,” Energy Information Administration, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=vm (Accessed November 3, 2013)

254

Ibid.

94

lacking the resources to exploit.255 Rather, it lacks the expertise to do so. As with its oil
industry, Vietnam has relied on granting exploration and extraction contracts to numerous
foreign firms. Nevertheless, Vietnam faces the same dilemma with its natural gas fields
as it does with the oil fields. That is, the threat of Chinese obstruction in disputed
maritime areas.
Marine Resources
Having a coastline of 3,260km and an EEZ of more than 1 million km2, marine
sources are a vital component of the Vietnamese economy and its food security.256 In
2010 seafood exports accounted for 7% of Vietnam’s total exports; providing the second
largest amount of foreign exchange.257 The SRV also has the second largest amount of
fishers in the region after China.258The steady growth of the fishing sector has allowed
Vietnam to become one of one the largest seafood exporters in the world. In 2007
Vietnam ranked 12th in fishing yields, 7th in fishing export value, and 3rd in aquatic
species farming.259 It is believed that there are about 3.4 million people in Vietnam who
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are directly involved in aquaculture activities and in capture fisheries.260 In the first 9
months of 2012 Vietnam exported roughly $4.5 billion worth of seafood. The U.S., E.U.,
and Japan are the main importers. Japan in particular has been increasing its purchases of
seafood from Vietnam which was reflected by a 19% growth on a year by year basis
during this period. Seafood exports to Japan were valued at $795 million and were 17.53%
of the total Vietnamese seafood export in 2012.261
Like the Philippines, Vietnam relies on fisheries and aquatic products for its food
consumption. It is estimated that fish provide 30-40 percent of the protein in Vietnamese
diets. In 1995, the National Institute of Nutrition in Hanoi estimated that the annual fish
consumption per capita in Vietnam was 18.5kg.262 Therefore, access to the SCS in order
to secure its food and economic needs is vital. Repeated clashes between Chinese
maritime vessels and Vietnamese fishermen are among the top concerns for the
Vietnamese government as it tries to expand an already lucrative industry.
Sino-Vietnamese Disputes
Sino-Vietnamese security relations are among the most complex and conflict
prone in the region. In effect:
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“Two millennia of Chinese overlordship, combined with an intense relationship over the
past 60 years characterized by extremes of amity and enmity, have shaped Vietnam’s
China psyche to deeply ambivalent: respect for a fraternal socialist country whose
economic reforms Hanoi seeks to emulate, coexisting with deep resentment, bordering
hatred, of Chinese condescension, bullying and perceived attempts to control the
country’s political destiny.”263

The amity that existed between the CCP and the Communist Party of Vietnam
degenerated almost as soon as the SRV was founded in 1976 as a result of the PRC
takeover of the Paracels two years prior. Hanoi’s earlier position supporting PRC claims
to the SCS were repudiated as the SRV restated its claims to the Paracels and the Spratly
archipelagos. 264 Vietnam’s loss of the Paracels resulted in its first occupation of six
Spratly Island features as a form of retaliation against China. Although the occupation
was initially conducted by South Vietnamese forces, upon reunification SRV troops
seized control of the islets and continued to occupy 15 more.265
The disputes between the two countries in the SCS remained relatively stable until
1988. In 1988 Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed in the Spratly Islands over
Fiery Cross Reef. The battle would end with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces after
incurring heavy losses. Three Vietnamese naval vessels and 72 sailors were lost in that
battle.266 This event marked China’s first occupation of a Spratly Island feature. The 1974
seizure of the Paracel Islands by China, as well as the 1988 battle that allowed China to
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gain a foothold in the Spratly Islands were facilitated by the changing power dynamics in
the region.
The events of 1974 were made possible partly because of Sino-American
rapprochement and because of U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. “The U.S.
role was confined to helping the South Vietnamese escape from the islands.”267 In the
case of the 1988 events, the Chinese were aided by the fact that the Soviet Union had
begun to withdraw aid to Vietnam and was pursuing a normalization of relations with the
PRC after decades of growing enmity between the two former allies. The Soviet Union’s
position as a military ally for Vietnam had effectively ended, giving China the
opportunity to enforce its claims militarily.268 The Chinese reasoned that neither power
would be concerned over the SCS disputes. Their calculations would be proven correct
by the relatively muted response from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of
the Fiery Reef clash.
The disputes remained heated through 1992 when the Vietnamese government
accused China of drilling for oil in Vietnamese waters and landing troops in a reef. In that
same year the Chinese government seized 20 Vietnamese cargo ships which were
transporting goods from Hong Kong.269 Even though military clashes between the two
countries have not been commonplace since the early 1990s, the confrontations have
merely switched to the civilian sphere. The numerous Chinese maritime enforcement
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agencies have been accused of harassing fishermen and oil exploration ships in the
disputed seas. Vietnam claims that since 2005 the Chinese have seized 63 fishing boats
along with 725 crew members. These fishermen are then required to pay exorbitant fines
for their release.270 In similar fashion, Vietnam accuses these agencies of obstructing its
energy companies from conducting oil and natural gas exploration in its waters. In a
recent event, Chinese vessels cut the seismic cables of a ship belonging to Vietnam’s
state-owned energy company, PetroVietnam. 271 Although China and Vietnam have
settled on the demarcation of their respective EEZs and marine borders along the Gulf of
Tonkin, the territorial disputes in the SCS remain unresolved issues between the two
neighbors.
It is clear that Sino-Vietnamese security relations have been largely unstable due
to Vietnamese perception of a “China threat.” During the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2013,
Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung delivered the keynote address in which he
made his security perception of China very clear by stating that “somewhere in the region,
there have emerged preferences for unilateral might, groundless claims, and actions that
run counter to international law and stem from imposition and power politics.”272The
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statement was made in clear reference to the PRC. China’s military modernization and
increasingly assertive SCS policy has been a major concern for Vietnamese leaders, not
only because of their proximity to mainland China, but also because Vietnam’s military
capabilities are significantly inferior to those of the PLA. Nonetheless, while Vietnam
neither possess the resources to match Chinese military expenditure, nor is it able to meet
a serious PLA challenge on the SCS, it has been pursuing a strategy of minimum credible
defense in order to deter further Chinese incursions into what it believes are its territorial
waters. This has led to increasing defense budgets and modernization programs for the
Vietnamese military.
VPA Modernization
The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) is the official name for the active military
services of Vietnam. Like the PLA it encompasses the three main services: the ground
forces, navy, and air force. Through the late 80s and early 90s the VPA saw a significant
decrease in funding. This was due to the suspension of financial assistance from the
U.S.S.R. as well as the fact that Vietnam’s economy was unable to support any
substantial acquisitions. However, increased Chinese activities in the SCS as well as
economic growth prompted the SRV to begin modernizing its armed forces. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that by 2012 the
SRV spent roughly $3.36 billion in defense annually.273
Because the focus of Vietnam’s security agenda has been the SCS, its
modernization program concentrates on acquisitions that enhance its naval and air
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capabilities. Russia has been the main benefactor of Vietnam’s foreign purchases. Since
1995 the VPA has acquired 12 SU-27S/Flanker-B and 4 SU-30MK fighters to enhance its
air wings. 274 The four SU-30MKs are to be supplemented by an additional 16 in the
coming years. 275 Vietnam’s geographical proximity to the Spratly Islands, where it
maintains roughly 600 troops, allows these fighters to conduct longer sorties than their
counterparts based in Southern China. These fighters come equipped with modern
Russian anti-ship and anti-air missiles, which significantly increase Vietnam’s air force
which has relied on obsolete MIG 21 fighters for decades. To enhance its defenses
Vietnam has also acquired two S-300 SAM platforms and two K-300 Bastion-P Coastal
defense systems.276
In addition to enhancing its air capabilities, the VPA has been procuring a
substantial amount of naval hardware. The most significant of these acquisitions has been
the purchase of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia in a deal valued at $1.8 billion.277
Another important purchase has been the Gepard-3 frigates, also procured from Russia.
The VPA believed that acquiring the “stealthy Gepard Class light frigates will add
surface warfare and patrol punch, alongside new Molniya/ Project 12418 missile-armed
Fast Attack Craft.”278 While the first two Gepards were built for surface warfare, the next
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two will optimized for anti-submarine warfare; clearly indicating Vietnam’s fear of
China’s growing submarine capabilities.279
Even though Vietnam has been predominantly reliant on Russian weapons to
modernize its inventory, it appears that it has made efforts to diversify and acquire
hardware from western firms. In a recent event the SRV concluded a deal to purchase
four SIGMA-class ships from the Netherlands. These ships are modular and can be
modified to fit the specifications of the client state. Vietnam’s SIGMA 9814 vessels will
measure about 98 meters and weigh slightly less than the 2,100-ton Gepard at 1,950 tons.
The ships come equipped with ASMs, torpedo launchers and air-defense missiles. 280
Vietnam is also in negotiations with India to purchase its BrahMos supersonic cruise
missile to enhance its missile capabilities.281
There are also indications that Vietnam is attempting to develop a domestic
shipbuilding capability. Roughly “$3.8 billion is reported to have been invested to build
30-40 400-ton warships.” 282 Another investment has been made to construct a large
military harbor at Haiphong. When completed, it will be the second largest naval base in
the country after Cam-Ranh Bay. This harbor will have the capacity to dock 40,000-ton
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warships and about 40-60 naval vessels and submarines. 283 It is reported that “a fast
patrol boat and a troop carrier were completed by a shipyard at Haiphong in September
and October” of 2012.284
While few details exist about Vietnam’s military doctrines, it appears that its
acquisitions program indicates a similar approach to the one taken by the PLA. In essence,
it might be pursuing an A2/AD against China in regards to the SCS. Due to the fact that
China borders the SCS and possesses military capabilities far exceeding those of its
Southeast Asian neighbors, Vietnam may find it difficult to put such a stratagem in play.
However, a modernized and capable VPA could present a credible enough force to deter
further encroachment into the SCS by China, or at the very least safeguard its current
possessions in the Spratlys. Considering that China’s own SLOC must pass through
Vietnam’s periphery, it may be a viable strategy to pursue.
Japan-Vietnamese Relations
Like many Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam endured Japanese Imperial
occupation during WWII. However, since the 1973 when the Japanese officially
recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), the government that would
eventually reunify the country in 1976, the two sides have enjoyed relatively stable
relations. Japan has been a top trading partner with Vietnam since the 1970s. By 1976
Japan had become the SRV’s second largest trading partner after the Soviet Union.285
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Japan became the largest contributor of foreign aid to the new Vietnamese government
outside of the communist bloc; this aid took the form of grants that were essentially war
reparations to the SRV.286
Today Japan continues to be a major trading partner of the SRV. As of 2012,
Japan is the second largest export partner at 11.8% and third largest import partner at
10.4% of Vietnam.287 In 2009 the two countries signed the “Agreement Between Japan
and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for an Economic Partnership.” 288 The trade
agreement is expected to lower tariffs and promote economic cooperation between the
two countries.289 Economic cooperation could deepen in the energy field as well. In an
effort to increase LNG imports, Vietnam has sought assistance from the Tokyo Gas
Company “to develop the Thi Vai LNG terminal in the Vung Tau province.”290 Japan has
also agreed to aid Vietnam in developing a nuclear energy industry. In 2011 the “JapanViet Nam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement” came into force. This would be a mutually
beneficial venture as Japan possesses expertise in nuclear reactor design and maintenance,
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allowing Vietnam to export more of its oil and natural gas resources in order to increase
its GDP.291
In addition to the growing economic ties, much progress has also been achieved in
the security sphere. Mutual concerns over China’s assertive posture on the ECS and SCS
have brought both countries closer in discussions over the security of the SLOC and the
territorial disputes they have with China in their respective areas. In a 2011 meeting
between former Japanese “Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa and his Vietnamese
counterpart, Phung Quang Thanh,” the two sides “signed Memorandum on Defense
Cooperation and Exchange.” 292 During the summit Ichikawa told Thanh that “The
relationship between Japan and Vietnam [had] entered a new stage of development” and
that Vietnam was a “strategic partner for peace and stability in Asia, and we want to
deepen our partnership.”293 Under the provisions of this memorandum the JSDF and the
VPA will conduct military exchanges and Vice-Minister-level officials from each country
will have regular dialogue.294
As with the Philippines, the Japanese have indicated that they are interested in
providing Vietnam coast guard patrol vessels. In a 2013 summit Japanese Prime Minister
Abe and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung discussed their concerns over
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maritime peace and stability, particularly the SCS.295 Prime Minister Abe chose Vietnam
as his first destination after taking office, indicating the importance of Vietnam as a
strategic partner for Japan in the region. In a sign of reciprocity the Vietnamese invited
Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera to visit the naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.
According to the Vietnamese, Onodera was the first foreign defense or military related
official to ever be invited at the base.296 In a conference after his visit to the naval base,
Onodera was asked about future security cooperation with the Vietnamese. He indicated
that the two countries had been performing field exercises in diving medicine;
furthermore, there were future exercises scheduled that would concentrate on submarine
rescue. 297 Since the Kilo-class submarines are the first significant submarines that
Vietnam has operated, Japans’ assistance in this area is considered vital.
As Vietnam’s military modernizes it may look increasingly to Japan as a source
of hardware and training. China’s substantial marine mine inventory could prompt the
Vietnamese to purchase MCM vessels from Japan, while simultaneously securing
training from one of the most capable MCM forces in the world. This particular
arrangement would not contravene Japan’s strict weapons trade guidelines since these
vessels do not have offensive capabilities. In a more challenging prospect, former
Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa pointed out that Vietnam may be among
the countries to which Japan would allow the sale of its state of the art diesel
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submarines.298 Although no further official statements have been made in regards to this
subject, should conditions in the ECS and SCS continue to deteriorate, Japan could be
prompted to remove even more restrictions on its military transfer guidelines.
Chapter VI: Conclusion
Japan and Southeast Asia
Although Japan has been more politically active in Southeast Asia in recent years
as a result of its fear of growing Chinese influence, it remains restricted in large part by
its constitution. That being said, amending Article IX of the Japanese constitution may
not be necessary for Japan to play a more proactive security role in its own backyard. If
Japan were able to participate in collective security agreements it would most likely only
sign one with the United States. The fact is that creating any collective security
agreement with a third party would have to involve the United States and would only
escalate the existing tensions with China. If Japan were to sign collective security
agreements with China’s neighboring countries it would all but confirm Chinese fears of
a U.S.-Japan strategy of encirclement and containment. Therefore, a more proactive
Japan does not necessarily mean military security guarantees to its Southeast Asian
neighbors, but rather a clear alternative to China by providing political and material
support.
By pursuing deeper economic integration and relaxing its weapons export
guidelines Japan can position itself as a credible strategic partner to Southeast Asian
countries. Through its ODA programs Japan would be able to subsidize weapon
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purchases of China’s smaller neighbors in the same manner it has done for the
Philippines with the provision of coast guard vessels. By facilitating military capacity
building in the Philippines and Vietnam, Japan would be assisting these countries in their
efforts to build a minimum credible defense against growing Chinese capabilities and
therefore make sure that its SLOC is not completely dominated by the PLA. At the same
time, by limiting its agreements to economic and capacity building, Japan can ensure that
it does not become a party to an armed conflict in the SCS unless it chooses to do so on
its own terms.
China and Japan: Growing Enmity
Despite significant economic interdependence between China and Japan, a pattern
of growing enmity has emerged in recent years. Mutual suspicion between the two
powers in the East Asian RSC have fostered an environment of rising nationalism and
increasing securitization language towards each other. China’s military modernization
has done much to give an impetus to Japan’s normalization process. Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe ran on a nationalist campaign and on a promise to be tougher on
China. Japanese leaders perceive that China’s increasingly assertive stance in its
territorial disputes is a result of the substantial military expenditures of the PRC as well
as the patriotic education to which Chinese students are exposed. In the 2014 World
Economic Forum at Davos, Abe explicitly stated that he perceived China’s 10% annual
increases in defense spending as a provocation. He further indicated that a reduction of
tensions between the two countries would not occur so long as China continued its
military build-up. The Prime Minister went as far as likening Sino-Japanese relations to
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that of Germany and Great Britain on the eve of World War I; explaining that despite
deep economic ties the two countries ultimately went to war with each other. 299
Abe’s confrontational approach towards China appears to be informed by his
belief that the Chinese educational system is essentially “anti-Japanese.” He believes that
the emphasis on patriotic education in China creates a “’deeply ingrained’ need to spar
with Japan and other Asian neighbors over territory. This is due to the fact that the ruling
Communist Party uses the disputes to maintain strong domestic support.”300 Abe, who
enjoys a 71% approval rating in his home country, has promised to make revisions to the
pacifist constitution and increase the defense budget. Thus far he has delivered on
defense spending. In 2013 he approved the first defense budget increase in 11 years. The
JSDF and the JCG will receive a 0.8% and a 1.9% increase respectively.301 In that same
year Abe’s cabinet promulgated Japan’s first ever national security strategy (NSS). The
document explicitly identified China as a potential threat; stating that:
“China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas
through its continued increase in its military budget without sufficient transparency. In
addition, China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status
quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing
order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China
Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its
activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan’s territorial
waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China has shown the move
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that appears to unduly infringe the freedom of overflight above the high seas by
establishing its own “Air Defense Identification Zone” over the East China Sea.”302

The document also calls for strengthening the unity of ASEAN and promotes progress
towards the formulation of a CoC in the SCS. Furthermore, the reinforcement of the U.S.Japan alliance is viewed as a key priority to maintaining peace and security in the
region.303
Chinese officials have responded in kind. They see Japanese military
normalization as a dangerous development and often equate it with a return to militarism
and fascism. In response to a recent visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine by Prime
Minister Abe, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying commented that
the visit was proof of lingering militarism in Japan, declaring that “militarist aggression is
the darkest demon in the country's history. Japan will truly regain trust from its Asian
neighbors and the international society only if it dares to face and beat the demon in its
history and its mind, or it will remain in the dock of history.304 Chinese Foreign Minister,
Wang Yi echoed Mrs. Hua’s statements by saying that the Yasukuni Shrine was a
“symbol of Japanese militarism.” The minister also stated that the world "should never
allow fascist and militarist ideas to revive themselves in any shape or form." 305 The
reference to Japan’s imperialist period was implicit.
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Tokyo’s recent military budget increases and actions in Southeast Asia have also
been a concern for Beijing. In response to Japan’s NSS, state-run Xinhua published an
article declaring that Japan’s new role as a “proactive contributor to peace” is merely a
“phony coat” to “conceal Japan’s wild ambition to become a military power.”306 The
authors claim that “in military terms, being "proactive" means acting proactively or even
making preemptive strikes.”307 In more official and direct statements, Defense Ministry
spokesman Geng Yansheng said that “China is firmly opposed to Japan’s relevant
actions,” referring to Japan’s NSS.308 Spokesman Geng claimed that Japan was playing
up “China’s military threat” and that this would increase regional tensions. He went on to
express that:
“On the one hand, Japan claimed that it is a peace-loving country, and that it adheres to a
defensive defense policy and will not be a military power. On the other hand, Japan is
peddling the so-called "proactive pacifism."
On the one hand, Japan claimed that it respects freedom, democracy, human rights and
the rule of law, but on the other hand, it repeatedly denied its history of aggression during
the Second World War, challenged the post-war international order and hurt the feeling
of the people of the war-victim countries.
Japan has on the one hand claimed to strengthen international coordination, safeguard
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and make efforts to ensure security and
prosperity of the international community, but on the other hand it sticked to the Cold
War mentality and beefed up military alliance with relevant countries.”309
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The spokesman also noted that Japan has been proactively wooing other countries in
order to create regional confrontation and roil the regional situation.310 Japan’s defense
cooperation agreements with a number of ASEAN countries serve as the basis for this
belief.
Using more provocative language, PLA Air Force Colonel, Dai Xu, called on
China to wage a short and decisive war against one of the claimants in SCS or Japan. He
argued that a border clash like the 1962 war with India would deliver long-term peace.
Col. Dai claims that U.S. support for its allies is weak and that China should call this
bluff and “respond to these empty provocations with something real.” 311 Dai called
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, America’s running dogs in Asia, adding that "we
only need to kill one, and it will immediately bring the others to heel."312
This escalation of inflammatory rhetoric between the two countries directly
impacts the security of the region. Japan sees China’s assertiveness on security matters as
a threat to its national interests. This inevitably leads Japan to conduct balancing actions
in the form of economic and defense cooperation agreements with Southeast Asian
countries who share Japan’s concerns about China. On the other hand, Beijing sees
Tokyo’s actions as a move towards militarism and as a containment strategy that aims to
encircle China with pro-U.S.-Japan ASEAN members. This results in patterns of growing
enmity which consequently lead to deteriorating bilateral relations and increased tensions.
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As a result, the tense political environment has not been conducive to conflict resolution
measures or cooperation on security matters.
Securitizing China
China’s geographic centrality as well as its economic and political clout gives it
inherent advantages in the East Asian RSC. All ASEAN members as well as Japan are
intrinsically connected to China through economic interdependence as well as the
security preoccupations of the rising power. Since China’s economic reforms in the late
1970s every country in the region has benefitted from increased Chinese investments as
well as market opportunities in the mainland. China’s “charm offensive” of the early
2000s did much to build good-will among Southeast Asian countries which had been
concerned with China’s aggressive SCS policy throughout the 1990s. However, events
that have occurred in recent years have done a lot of damage to China’s image in the
region. A 2013 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center indicated that both Japan and
the Philippines’ (Vietnam was not polled) view China’s military power negatively. The
poll showed that 96% of Japanese and 68% of Philippine respondents considered China’s
growing military power as a “bad thing”.313 The same poll asked “how big are territorial
disputes between China and your country?” to which 82% of Japanese and 90% of
Philippine respondents answered it was a “big problem.”314
The negative downturn in China’s image has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. The
Global Times, a pro-government publication, conducted its own poll and found similar
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results. The poll involved more than 14,400 respondents from 14 countries which
included the U.S., Russia, Japan, India, Vietnam, and South Korea.315 The data showed
“that the closer you are to China, the more likely you are to have a negative view of it.
Some 25.4 percent of respondents from the neighboring countries said they like China,
10.6 percent lower than those from the non-neighboring countries.”316 According to the
poll some 29.4% describe China as “belligerent” and 28.1% say it is “complicated.” Only
13.3% of the respondents thought of China as peaceful. Perhaps even more troubling was
the fact that people from neighboring countries believed that their country would have a
competitive or confrontational relationship with China within the next 10 years;
indicating that China is viewed as a threat by the citizens of neighboring countries317
Regional tensions have recently spiked as a result of China’s unilateral
declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the ECS. This move has
sparked fears among Southeast Asian countries that China may soon do the same in the
SCS. The Chinese Defense Ministry has reinforced such fears by stating that it will
“establish other air defense identification zones at an appropriate time after completing
preparations.” 318 Due to the fact that neither Vietnam nor the Philippines possess the
capabilities to deter China from adopting an ADIZ in the SCS, they find the prospect of a
SCS ADIZ as a serious threat to their claims in the region. Philippine Foreign Secretary,
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Albert Del Rosario, has stated that a SCS ADIZ presents the threat that “China will
control the air space [in the South China Sea] ... It transforms an entire air zone into
China's domestic air space."319
Philippine President Aquino has be one of the staunchest critics of China since
taking office. In a 2014 interview he made an international plea by asking the nations
around the world to support the Philippines in resisting China’s assertive claims in the
SCS. He likened the situation of his country to that of Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s
when the West accepted Germany’s demands for the Sudetenland. He stated: “If we say
yes to something we believe is wrong now, what guarantee is there that the wrong will
not be further exacerbated down the line?”320 He went on to say: “At what point do you
say, ‘Enough is enough’? Well, the world has to say it — remember that the Sudetenland
was given in an attempt to appease Hitler to prevent World War II.”321 His remarks are
indicative of his country’s concerns for China’s military buildup in the SCS. These
remarks could have been fueled by reports from China that the PLA has drawn up plans
to seize Thitu Island from the Philippines in 2014. The report said that “there will be no
invasion into Filipino territories,” negating Philippine sovereignty claims to the island
and that “the battle is aimed at recovery of the island stolen by the Philippines from
China.”322
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Access to vital oil and marine resources has also been an area where China’s
actions have elevated tensions in the region. China’s recent efforts to develop oil and gas
in contested territory have led to condemnation from the Vietnamese who see China’s
actions in the vicinity of the Paracels as illegal. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Luong Thanh Nghi asked China to “cease all activities that violate Vietnam’s
sovereignty.” 323 This could be a growing problem for the Vietnamese who have
experienced Chinese interference while conducting their own oil and gas surveys. China
has also demanded that the Philippines cease giving out contracts to oil companies in the
Spratly archipelago as it considers these territories its own. These events directly affect
Vietnamese and Philippine energy security and have the potential to lead to further
clashes between the claimants.
China’s unilateral imposition of fishing bans in the SCS has also met deep
criticism from Vietnam and the Philippines whose economies and population are heavily
reliant on the fishing industry. The most recent ban took effect on January 1, 2014 and
obliges foreign fishing vessels to obtain approval before entering waters which the local
Hainan government says are under its jurisdiction. There were instantaneous responses
from Vietnam and the Philippines regarding the ban. Vietnamese Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Luong Thanh Nghi called the new ban
“illegal and invalid” and seriously violate Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa
(Paracels) and Truong Sa (Spratlys) islands. “Vietnam demands that China abolish the
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above said wrongful acts, and practically contribute to the maintenance of peace and
stability in the region,”324

Furthermore, Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin was quoted saying that
“China is projecting itself as a superpower, they have been aggressive lately.” In addition,
he stated that “we are not following the rules of China in our own territory, why are we
going to follow them if we fish in our own seas.” 325 Defiance by Vietnam and the
Philippines may lead to maritime clashes considering the fact that China has routinely
seized or harassed fishing vessels from both of these countries.
Heightened tensions and an increasingly negative opinion of China in the region
have led to more frequent use of securitizing language aimed at China by Japan, Vietnam, and

the Philippines. This indicates that the PRC is quickly becoming the primary security
concern among key East Asian RSC countries. Consequently, many of the smaller states
in the region have sought to balance China’s influence and power with that of the United
States and its primary ally in the region, Japan. America’s pivot to the region has been
generally welcomed by ASEAN states who have sought to reduce their exposure to
China.326 At the same time, countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are exploring the
possibility of allowing the U.S. greater access to their naval facilities as a way to hedge
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against China.327 As a key ally of the U.S. and as power in its own right, Japan has also
been garnering support among ASEAN states in its efforts to maintain freedom of
navigation in the region. Japan is increasingly being seen as another possible hedge vis-àvis China by Southeast Asian states who share Japan’s concerns about China’s growing
military capabilities and its implications for the freedom of navigation in the SCS.328
De-securitizing Japan
Japan has had a tumultuous history with most countries in the East Asian RSC as
a result of its actions during WWII. Brutal occupation of most of its neighbors and
perceived inadequate apologies for the atrocities it committed have been a serious thorn
in Japan’s relations with its neighbors, particularly China and the two Koreas. Although
the issue of its WWII legacy continue to plague Japan’s bilateral relations with China and
the Koreas, ASEAN countries have been more forgiving. In 2008 the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan (MOFA) commissioned TNS, a Singapore-based market research
company, to conduct an opinion poll in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam regarding Japan. When asked if Japan was a trustworthy friend
for ASEAN countries, 90% or more of the respondents from all six countries answered
yes.329 When asked about what they presently thought about Japan’s acts during WWII,
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59% and or more of the people surveyed in all six countries said that while Japan did
some bad things, it was not an issue now. 330 A Pew Research Center Poll in 2013
reinforced the 2008 findings showing ASEAN countries that were surveyed have a 78%
or more favorable view of Japan (again, Vietnam was not polled).331
Japan’s image has been slowly repaired in Southeast Asia as a result of its
generous ODA packages to ASEAN member countries. Its soft power has also been on
the rise due to its constructive participation in the Timor-Leste and Cambodian Peace
Keeping Operations as well as its disaster relief assistance to countries struck by natural
disasters. In the wake of the 2004 Tsunami Japan provided a total of $697 million to the
affected countries, almost double of China’s $379 million contribution. Indonesia and Sri
Lanka would receive the largest aid package at $250 million and $175 million
respectively.
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Philippines, the Japanese government pledged $30 million and deployed it largest-ever
relief effort overseas. A Japanese flotilla of three vessels made up of a cruiser, a cargo
ship, a fuel supply ship and eight helicopters was supplemented by 1,000 JSDF troops on
Philippine soil. 333 In a December summit between Prime Minister Abe and President
Aquino that year, Japan raised its contribution for emergency relief in the Philippines to
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$56.1 million.334 This was a major upset for Beijing which endured worldwide criticism
for its initial $100,000 offering. After international condemnation China pledged an
additional $1.6 million and deployed a medical relief ship with a 51-person medical team
to assist in the Philippines.335
As previously mentioned, Japan has been critical in the provision of capacity
building for coast guards in Southeast Asia. It has provided funds and training for many
in the region in order to promote safe navigation in the SCS and continues to encourage
information sharing about vessels and individuals suspected of committing piracy and
armed robbery in the high seas.336 Japan has also been mediator for the Mindanao Peace
Process between the Philippines and the Moro Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF is one
the strongest Islamic separatist groups in the south of the Philippines and has fought the
central government for years in order to establish an independent country. In 2012 Japan
successfully negotiated a framework between the two sides in which they agreed to work
towards a peace settlement that would eventually lead to the creation of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 337 In 2013 Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed
Japan’s commitment to the Mindanao Peace Process and pledged “$2 million of
emergency grant aid for the internally-displaced persons arising from the armed conflict
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in Zamboanga City, Mindanao Island.”338 Additionally, in its efforts to promote stability
in Southeast Asia, for the first time since WWII, Japan provided military aid to a foreign
country in 2012 when it approved a $2 million package for its military engineers to train
Cambodian and Timor-Leste troops in disaster relief and road building.339
Decades of investments, ODA, maritime cooperation, and peacekeeping
operations in the region have effectively de-securitized Japan for many of the ASEAN
states. This is in contrast to China which while continuing to enjoy the position of top
trading partner for most ASEAN members, has increasingly been securitized by many in
the region; a development that Japan has been eager to exploit. While economic ties
between ASEAN and China continue to grow at a marked pace, and the United States
continues to be the region’s main stabilizing force and security provider, Japan is in a
geostrategic position to fulfill both roles. Poor relations with China have prompted Japan
to invest more of its money on ASEAN states. In 2013 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
from Japan to China plunged by 37% to $6.5 billion. Meanwhile, FDI to Southeast Asia’s
“four major economies – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines – surged by
over 120% to almost $7.9 billion.” 340 Tokyo has also expanded its currency swap
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agreements with a number of ASEAN countries in order to help stabilize financial
markets in Asia.341
There are also signs that the normalization of the JSDF has not been considered a
threat by Southeast Asian countries as it has been by China and South Korea. This is
evident in the numerous defense cooperation agreements that Japan has concluded with
many ASEAN states like Vietnam and the Philippines as well as Indonesia. In an
interview with the Financial Times, Philippine Foreign Minister Albert Del Rosario said
that his country was “looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a
significant balancing factor.” 342 In a similar fashion, Indonesian Defense Minister
Purnomo Yusgiantoro has publicly expressed support for Japan’s plans to develop its
armed forces, further indicating that many countries in the region are comfortable with
Japan’s efforts to play a more substantial role in the security of the East Asian RSC.343
RSCT and Predictive Scenarios
In RSCT, processes of securitization and desecuritization as well as patterns of
amity and enmity link the actors in the region.344 The East Asian RSC certainly exhibits
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these attributes. Economic, food, energy, and traditional security interdependence are
traits which all states in the RSC share. Furthermore, historical friendships as well as
bitter war legacies continue to inform the bilateral relations of many of the actors in the
region. Given the information presented above, RSCT can be used to evaluate a number
of different scenarios that demonstrate how the region could transform itself in the future
which can in turn help predict how the SCS disputes will be resolved.
The emergence of the East Asian RSC was the result of a post-Cold War world.
This Supercomplex was a great power bi-polar RSC where China became the militarypolitical center while Japan became the economic center. China’s military-political
significance stemmed from its long-standing links with Southeast Asian countries. 345 It
would be unable to play a major economic role in its early years as a result of its stillnascent economy. On the other hand, although Japan was experiencing an economic
recession beginning with the 1990s it still remained the second largest economy in the
world at the time. However, the historical legacy of its brutal occupation of numerous
countries in the region during WWII prohibited the Japanese from playing a key militarypolitical role. The evolution of the Supercomplex and its many security concerns hinges
on the domestic developments of the two great powers and the relationship between the
two. The decade since the publication of Regions and Powers: The Structure of
International Security has seen significant developments which allow for more concise
predictions.
In the past decade China has become the second largest economy in the world,
overtaking Japan, and has become the second largest military defense spender, behind the
345
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United States. While economic reforms continue at a regular pace, political reforms have
yet to materialize. China, at least for the foreseeable future, will continue to be governed
by a one-party system. Quite significantly, China’s increased military capabilities have
also allowed it to become more assertive in the territorial disputes with its neighbors.
These developments have led to increased tensions in the ECS and the SCS where the
disputes have led to clashes between China and Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. As a
result, China has become the primary security concern for many countries in the region.
Although China will continue to enjoy deeper economic integration with neighboring
countries, many of the smaller states are now looking at Japanese investment and security
cooperation as a way to offset China’s influence.
For its part, Japan has been gradually stepping out of nearly two decades of
economic stagnation. It continues to be an economic power, ranked number 3 behind
China and the United States. It also continues to have the most advanced military in the
region, backed by the 5th largest defense budget in the world. More significantly, its
normalization process has been sped up in recent years as a result of a perceived “China
threat.” Japan’s citizens are now more supportive of the constitutional changes required
to fully normalize the JSDF status and make Japan a normal power. A more politically
active Japan has been pursuing its own aggressive policy in Southeast Asia by redoubling
its economic investments in the region and concluding defense cooperation agreements
with a number of Southeast Asian countries; particularly Vietnam and the Philippines
which it considers its strategic partners for maintaining the freedom of navigation in the
SCS. Japan has essentially taken advantage of the mounting fear among neighboring
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states that China’s growing military power will have detrimental effects on their security
and national interests.
The enmity between China and Japan, which had remained under the surface
when the two powers normalized relations, has come to the forefront in recent years.
Mutual suspicion and different interpretations of the events that occurred during WWII
have plagued the dialogue between the two countries. Furthermore, statements and
actions taken by officials from both countries have led to a serious deterioration in
bilateral relations. This growing enmity between the two powers has security
ramifications for the East Asia RSC. As dialogue and cooperation between the two polar
centers in the RSC diminishes, it is unlikely that successful negotiations over disputed
territory will occur. Far more likely, each will pursue strategic advantages over the other
in all available fields. As previously mentioned, Japan has been apt to exploit China’s
political missteps in the region as a means to pursue a more active security policy.
Given the information provided, what does RSCT tell us about the evolution of
the East Asian RSC? I suggest that there are two most likely scenarios, each giving a
different conclusion to the SCS disputes. Although mindful that there are numerous
possible outcomes to the evolution of the East Asian RSC, and thus the resolution of the
SCS disputes, the following two scenarios appear to be the most likely.
Scenario #1
Should Japan continue to ‘normalize’ and the U.S. Asian pivot fully materialize,
the East Asian RSC will become a true bipolar great power RSC. I say ‘true’ because for
the first decade of the 21st century, the East Asian RSC was almost wholly centered on
China due to America’s preoccupation in the Middle East and Japan’s domestic political
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instability. A bipolar Supercomplex in East Asia would have a legitimate counterweight
to China’s overwhelming geographical, economic, and growing military advantages.
China’s counterweight would essentially be the U.S.-Japan alliance. America’s pivot to
Asia would not be very effective without a more proactive Japanese military-political
agenda. This is due to the fact that Japan shares geographic links to the region while the
U.S., as a superpower, is spread across the globe with no real geographical presence in
the East Asian RSC. Conversely, Japan cannot be a pole by itself due to the fact that it
does not possess the demographic, economic, and military capability to project power at
the same level that China can. Therefore, a truly balanced bipolar RSC in East Asia
requires more proactive Japan willing to project beyond its borders as well as the U.S.
fully committed to its Asian rebalance.
By creating a true second pole to China, ASEAN would be able to more
effectively manage the SCS disputes by presenting a united front. This united front would
be made possible by credible Japanese economic as well as military-political engagement
in the region. In doing so, a CoC may be reached and pave the way for a more equitable
resolution of the territorial disputes. China could be more successfully socialized within
multilateral organizations and agreements to play a more constructive role in the security
of the region. A process like this could eventually lead to the desecuritization of China
among Southeast Asian countries and potentially lead to more significant integration.
This scenario clearly hinges on the continuation of stable domestic politics of the
three powers involved. For this scenario to come to fruition the political establishment of
Japan would have to avoid returning to the stagnating years of the post-Koizumi
administration. So far this lesson appears to have been learned. This would ensure
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political stability and continued progress on the normalization process. In the U.S.,
politicians need to be fully committed to the Asian pivot and not be significantly
distracted by other issues in another region. The fact of the matter is that short of another
devastating financial crisis, the East Asia RSC is poised to continue being the most
economically dynamic region in the world while possessing some of the most
troublesome territorial disputes. Those factors alone necessitate serious American
engagement in the region if it is to secure its interests there. For China the assumption is
made that economic growth, while slowing down in recent years, will continue to be
robust which would facilitate continued stability. Furthermore, Xi Jinping, the Chairman
of the CCP and leader of the PRC, has managed to consolidate more power under his
administration than any of his two previous counterparts were able to.
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centralization of power around Chairman Xi Jinping should enable him to tackle the vast
domestic challenges that China currently faces and therefore ensure China’s continued
economic and military growth.
Scenario #2
However, if Japan is unable to normalize significantly enough to provide credible
security engagement in the region, and the U.S. pivot is undermined, the most likely
outcome is a unipolar centered RSC around China. Normalization in Japan needs to reach
a level that allows it to project its security concerns beyond its immediate borders. If it
fails to do so China will have more room to maneuver and pursue its own militarypolitical agenda independently of the concerns of its neighbors. Likewise, if the U.S. Asia
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pivot is undermined or is not perceived as credible, Japan will not be able to do much on
its own even if it continues to normalize due to the fact that China enjoys geographic
demographic, economic, and military advantages that Japan simply cannot match despite
its economic and military prowess. This would mean that while Japan is completely
capable of protecting its own territory, it would be unable to secure its SLOC on the SCS
should the region evolve into a unipolar centered RSC.
This scenario may prove detrimental to the states contending with China over the
SCS. It would all but ensure that any negotiations that take place to resolve the disputes
would be done bilaterally, the way in which China has preferred to conduct them as its
advantage as a regional power would diminish the bargaining power of smaller states. In
this scenario ASEAN would be too disunited as American and Japanese economic and
security guarantees would not be credible and member countries’ exposure to China
would heavily influence their policies. As a result, ASEAN would be unable to reach a
unanimous consensus on the SCS and present a viable platform for negotiation. Therefore,
the resolution of the SCS disputes would not occur on equitable grounds.
Again, this scenario assumes that China will continue to have a relatively stable
domestic climate which is conducive to economic growth and increasing PLA
capabilities. While JSDF power-projection capabilities may be growing, geography and
demographics accord China with enough capacity to offset Japanese qualitative military
advantages outside of its own territory. This means that Japanese SLOC in the SCS could
be at risk without the aid and support of the American military. The U.S. military
establishment is certainly aware of the potential threat that China poses to the freedom of
navigation in the SCS and its interests in the region. This could at least guarantee that the
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Asian pivot receives significant attention in the political agenda of the U.S.; however,
budget constraints and polarized domestic politics could derail the pivot.
Moving Forward
The situation in the SCS is an ongoing process that continues to evolve on an
almost daily basis. It is clear that the two regional powers have interests in the SCS and
are pursuing different strategies to meet their economic and security needs. China’s
military capability has allowed it to push Vietnam and the Philippines on these disputes,
but as a consequence motivated them to internationalize the problem by attempting to
bring in the U.S. and its main regional ally, Japan, to counter it. The Japanese, galvanized
by a popular Prime Minister and motivated by growing tensions with China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, have been pursuing a more proactive policy in Southeast Asia
in order to secure its SLOC and ensure that China’s sweeping claims in the SCS do not
come to fruition. It would not be in Japan’s interest to see China control the SCS.
Although it is highly unlikely that Japan will forge mutual defense agreements
with any other nation as a result of its ban on collective defense, it is positioning itself as
a viable economic alternative to China and perhaps more importantly, as a provider of
political support and military equipment and training. As a result of China’s more
assertive policies and its subsequent securitization by key states in the region, the
prospects of productive negotiations seem unlikely. China, emboldened by its growing
capabilities and American neutrality on the SCS disputes, continues to prefer bilateral
negotiations. On the other hand, contending states, with Japan’s explicit support, continue
to advocate for a multilateral framework to resolve the disputes.
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Further Research
RSCT allows for some measure of prediction on how the region will evolve and
how the disputes may be resolved in the coming years. However, due to its realist
foundation, it does not adequately address the East Asian RSC pattern of increased
economic interdependence with China while simultaneously securitizing it. A liberal or
Institutionalist approach to studying this pattern may provide different conclusions on
how the region may evolve and how the numerous ongoing territorial disputes could be
resolved. Further research regarding the rising number of economic and trade agreements
formed between China and its neighbors may provide insight to the growing economic
interdependence in the region and its effects on the emergent number of international
organizations in the region. By understanding the level of interdependence among
countries in the area, it may be possible determine whether economic security and
interdependence is sufficient for stronger regional integration, or whether traditional
security concerns will continue to dominate the domestic agenda of China’s neighboring
states.
Another line of research that can be pursued is whether a proper conflict
resolution mechanism can emerge in the East Asian RSC. It is clear that historical enmity
between the two major powers and the increasing securitization of China among a
number of states in the region serve as impediments to effective confidence building
among neighboring states. Confidence building measures would be a prerequisite to
instituting proper conflict resolution regimes. All parties to the numerous disputes in the
region are aware that military conflict amongst them would not be beneficial. Therefore,
reaching a certain level of confidence building would necessitate the de-escalation of
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securitization and nationalist rhetoric. This is particularly important in the case of some
Southeast Asian countries towards China, Japan and S. Korea towards China, as well as
China and the two Koreas towards Japan.
Examining the rising nationalist sentiment among the disputing countries may
provide insightful information that would facilitate a better understanding on whether the
ruling elites in these countries are capable of reducing nationalist rhetoric or has
securitization language been so effectively disseminated that de-escalating would prove
to be political suicide, or perhaps whether it’s preferable to continue using it as a tool for
securing domestic support. This line of research could allow researchers and analysts to
ascertain whether confidence building measures are likely to develop, and therefore more
likely to evolve into proper conflict resolution regimes, or whether mutual distrust and
growing nationalism will continue to be an impediment to the formation of such regimes.
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